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When the famous astronaut Neil Armstrong made his first historic space flight in 
Gemini 8 (successfully docking two vehicles while in space), and had just reached the 
apex of his first orbit around earth, Houston Control asked him a series of questions, one 
of them being, “What does it feel like to be up in space?”; a reverent silence ensued and 
then Mr. Armstrong said, “Suddenly it’s now!”  Mr. Armstrong could not respond further 
to the question due to a series of additional questions that followed from Mission Control; 
he never elaborated on his statement.   
Upon his safe landing back to earth, Mr. Armstrong was contacted by a reporter 
who had monitored the radio traffic between the space craft and the Control Center and 
asked, “What did you mean when you said, it was suddenly now?” 
Mr. Armstrong answered by explaining that ever since he was a small boy he had 
dreamed of being an astronaut and imagined looking down on the earth from way up in 
space.  Later, as a young adult, all of Armstrong’s training and education was focused on 
that moment in time − when he would actually do what he had spent virtually his entire  
life preparing for − Mr. Armstrong said that when the question was asked, “How do you 
feel to be in space?”, it hit him that the moment in time he had waited for was “suddenly 
here!” and he was a bit overwhelmed. 
This thesis represents the last academic achievement necessary for completion of 
this Master’s program.  This effort is the culmination of an 18-month process that 
required focus, dedication, and sacrifice on the part of each student (and faculty member).  
Eighteen months does not seem like a long time, but much has happened personally, 
professionally, and family-wise.  For me, this represents a dramatic conclusion of 
personal effort and training that (as Mr. Armstrong said) feels like “it’s suddenly now!” 
Like most significant events and achievements in my life, they are as much a 
result of collective efforts and support than an individual personal triumph.  I cannot 
adequately express my thanks and gratitude to Dr. Chris Bellevita who, more than anyone 
else, was responsible for me being in this program.  His encouragement and prodding got 
 xii
me here.  I thank him for his wonderful and wise insight into learning and the many 
helpful suggestions and “lessons learned” he shared during this program.  He helped me 
through this whole process in ways that he will never know and helped me keep this 
endeavor in the proper perspective. 
I must thank too, Dr. Paul Stockton, who has become such a good friend and 
advocate for the FBI in this program.  Paul is a gifted teacher, animated and eloquent; his 
engaging style brings a wonderful perspective to his class discussions and forces 
thoughtful responses to difficult questions.  
To my talented and insightful thesis advisors, Robert Simeral and Dr. Bill Pelfrey, 
thank you for your thoughts, suggestions, and long hours of work on my behalf to make 
this a paper worth reading. 
To my class family of 0402, it has truly been a wonderful experience both 
personally and professionally to have made your acquaintance.  Each of you has enriched 
my life and taught me so much about homeland security, leadership, and thinking 
“outside the box.”  I will truly miss our in-residence times together in the future, but will 
always treasure the memories we have made.  Each of you are my friends forever, God 
bless you all in whatever roads you travel. 
To my beautiful, wonderful wife of nearly 26 years, marrying you has been the 
single best decision I have made in my life.  Thank you for all the selfless sacrifices you 
have cheerfully made on my behalf.  Your support, encouragement and love have 
constantly sustained me all these years.  Whatever my accomplishments have been, I owe 
them all to you. Thank you so much and I promise you more of my time.  
To four of the best kids a father could ever hope for: Holly, Ben, Annie, and 
Chelsea!  You have blessed my life in so many ways; thank you for your love, support, 
and friendship.  You all are the product of a very special love, anticipation, and dreams 
come-true. I thank you for who you are and what you are becoming!  I look forward to 
spending more time riding bikes, playing games, quiet talks alone, and just hanging out!  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the events of September 11, 2001, law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies were thrust into a new mainstream of international terrorism unlike anything of 
the past.  The need to collect, analyze, and disseminate good information across federal, 
state, and local jurisdictions became more important than ever.  As a nation, we have 
done much to increase security, revise response protocols, and strengthen interagency 
relationships in order to defend ourselves and prepare for the next terrorist attack.  There 
still remains a variety of issues that are unaddressed by most of our intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies in order for us to achieve the level of protection and security we 
desire, that is: the lack of actionable intelligence that is being shared at all levels.   
Just after September 11, 2001, most state and local agencies looked to the federal 
government for support, leadership, and intelligence information that would be useful in 
defending ourselves against another terrorist attack.  While the federal government has 
made efforts to improve the broader dissemination of information to state and local 
agencies, many still feel that the information provided by the federal government is 
dated, irrelevant to local issues, and generally not useful for local communities. 
A. PURPOSE 
Effective terrorism-related prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and 
recovery efforts depend on timely, accurate, and actionable information about whom the 
enemies are, where and how they operate, how they are supported, the targets the enemies 
intend to attack, and the method of attack they intend to use1. This thesis is intended to 
serve as a guide for efforts to: 
• Identify rapidly both immediate and long-term threats; 
• Identify persons involved in terrorism-related activities; and 
• Guide the implementation of information-driven and risk-based 
prevention, response, and consequence management efforts. 
 
 
1 Gilmore Commission “Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress,” White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, December 15, 2002: 3. 
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Terrorism-related intelligence is derived by collecting, blending, analyzing, and 
evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a continual basis. There 
is no single source for terrorism–related information. It can come through the efforts of 
the intelligence community; federal, state, tribal, and local law enforcement authorities; 
other government agencies (e.g., transportation, healthcare, general government), and the 
private sector (e.g., transportation, healthcare, financial, Internet/information technology). 
For the most part, terrorism-related information has traditionally been collected 
outside of the United States. Typically, the collection of this type of information was 
viewed as a responsibility for the intelligence community and, therefore, there was little 
to no involvement by most state and local law enforcement entities. The attacks of 
September 11, 2001, however, taught us that those wanting to commit acts of terrorism 
may live in our local communities and be engaged in criminal and/or other suspicious 
activity as they plan attacks on targets within the United States and its territories. 
 Important intelligence that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived from 
information collected by state, tribal, and local government personnel through crime 
control and other routine activities and/or by people living and working in our local 
communities. Successful counterterrorism efforts require that federal, state, tribal, local, 
and private-sector entities have an effective information sharing and collaboration 
capability to ensure they can seamlessly collect, blend, analyze, disseminate, and use 
information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences in support of prevention, 
response, and consequence management efforts. 
The President and the U.S. Congress have directed that an information sharing 
environment (ISE) be created in the next two years to facilitate information sharing and 
collaboration activities within the Federal Government (horizontally) and between 
Federal, State, tribal, local, and private-sector entities (vertically). The concept of 
intelligence/information fusion has emerged as the fundamental process (or processes) to 
facilitate the sharing of homeland security related information and intelligence at a 
national level, and, therefore, has become a guiding principle in defining the ISE.2 
 
2 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Presidential Directive (HSPD) #8,” White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, December 17, 2003, paragraph (c).  
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Given that state centers specifically designed to facilitate such intelligence 
exchange do not currently exist in any routine manner, this thesis has been prepared as 
guidance for state agencies contemplating such an enterprise.  These intelligence fusion 
centers should be designed to collect, analyze, and disseminate information to determine 
the credibility of terrorist threats and gauge their potential impact in their state or area.  
Based on this analysis of threat information, these fusion centers provide local and state 
policymakers and public safety officials with a variety of intelligence products useful at 
all stages of emergency operations. 
B. IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
The importance of this research is incredibly self evident because terrorism 
prevention consists of collective activities that support efforts to detect, protect against, 
and disrupt terrorist threats or attacks against the United States and its interests.  
Preventing a terrorist attack means taking appropriate actions to avoid an incident or to 
intervene to stop an incident from occurring. 
It is impossible to protect every potential target in our communities from every 
conceivable method of attack.  It is also unrealistic to believe that jurisdictions will 
possess the capacity to identify and arrest every person involved in terrorism related 
activity or planning.  Therefore, to be effective, prevention efforts must be intelligence-
driven, adaptable, and multifaceted to meet the needs of defending our homeland.  
Developing efficient and operationally sound intelligence fusion centers at the local level 
have appeared to be more effective than other conventional means in protecting national 
assets.  These centers, when properly organized can facilitate effective prevention efforts 
that depend on the ability of state, local, and tribal governments to collect, analyze, and 








3 United States Department of Homeland Security, “The National Response Plan,” White House 
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II. WHY THE NEED FOR FUSION CENTERS IN THE UNITED 
STATES TODAY? 
The events leading to the attacks of September 11, 2001, not only highlighted 
America’s lack of coordination within the intelligence community but it also reminded us 
that a terrorist attack in the United States was not a new phenomenon.  American law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies had not taken seriously previous attacks by our 
enemies and we paid a great price; something needed to change.  Since the 9/11 attacks, 
many Congressional, governmental, and private sector groups have met to discuss, 
analyze, and opine on what went wrong and who was to blame for the attacks.  The 9/11 
Commission and the Gilmore Commission Reports both articulated that “there lacks an 
acceptable level of awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 
capabilities to cope with the uncertain and ambiguous threat of terrorism…”4 
While no known international terrorist attacks have occurred in the United States 
since September 11, 2001, terrorist networks have carried out many attacks abroad, 
including the 2002 bombings in Bali, the 2002 bombing of a French Oil Tanker in 
Yemen, and the 2004 coordinated bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid.  The Al-
Qaeda terrorist network has openly called for a jihad against the United States and its 
citizens around the world, with all of this to consider, it is only logical to accept that more 
attacks within the United States are imminent.   
International terrorist groups are not our only adversaries; we have to consider 
also domestic terrorists groups, which have different purposes and agendas but still create 
the same political and economic disruption in our country as the international terrorist 
groups.  We are well aware that both domestic and international terrorist cells are living 
within the boundaries our own towns and cities across America.  If our adversaries are 
living among us, watching and waiting to act, we can not rely solely on bits of 
information (often dated) provided by federal agencies that do not have the ability to 
determine the timely value of the information at the local or regional level.  Conversely, 
 
4 Gilmore Commission, “Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress,” White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, December 15, 2002, 36. 
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federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies can benefit greatly from information 
provided by state and local entities.  A unified and coordinated integration of the two 
philosophies are needed.  Webster’s Dictionary defines integration as … “the forming, 
coordinating, and blending into a functioning and unified whole.”5  This is the type of 
spirited cooperation we need to fight terrorism in the United States today. 
The United States is currently the most technologically advanced, economically 
stable, and militarily superior country in the world and yet we don’t utilize our collective 
capacity to its fullest extent.  If one considers the possibilities of  unifying the resources 
(operational and intelligence-wise) of state and local law enforcement, federal law 
enforcement, state and federal intelligence agencies and bureaus, military, fire, EMS, 
public health, and private sector enterprises,  there is nothing that could not be done to 
make our country more safe and free of terrorism.  With this type of integrated 
cooperation, the mistakes surrounding the events of 9/11 can be eliminated.  There has 
not been a more urgent need in our recent national history when we have needed to 
become more united in our homeland security efforts.  The preventative flow of 
intelligence data at all levels, from threat analysis to vulnerability assessment and 
response, is connected through an integrated, comprehensive all-agency, all-government, 
and all-sector system that is timely, useful, and proactive on a local, state, and national 
level.  The enlistment of all our available resources, including the contributions of state 
and local governments providing inputs into this intelligence system, will help toward 
this end. 
This idea of bringing all of the law enforcement, intelligence, military, and private 
sector agencies together at one area location seems to be of more benefit to state and local 
agencies and has proven to be less difficult to define, establish, and operate than a 
national level center.   
In the analysis of the centers below, the writer has avoided the terms “best 
practices and best methods” because those terms are so relative.  What works well in Los 
Angeles may not work well in Atlanta.  Instead, each of the three centers will be 
 
5 Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (Merriam-Webster, Inc., Springfield, 
Massachusetts, 2003), 650. 
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highlighted and operational concepts and reasoning will be shared, each to be evaluated 
by the reader for their own utility.  There will be a recommendation chapter that will 
suggest what is needed (at a minimum) in order to establish a well defined and 
operationally productive center.  These suggestions are provided as guidance for states 
and localities to use as they consider establishing such centers but should not be 
considered as the “only way” a center can be created. 
The document that follows is a look at three highly successful and productive 
intelligence centers that each focus on intelligence gathering and sharing.  Each has a 
unique history and structure but they share a common goal: to facilitate timely and 
actionable information and intelligence sharing at all appropriate levels of government.  . 
A. FUSION CENTER INTERVIEWS 
Several states within the America currently have some form of information fusion 
processing.  I have chosen to examine three centers that have been pioneers in 
establishing state fusion centers and have proven track records of success in this field.  
This, however, does not mean that other states do not also have excellent information 
fusion centers and information sharing processes worthy of emulation.  I have chosen the 
Arizona Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (ACTIC),    The Georgia Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC), and the Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) 
in Los Angeles, California, as my benchmarks for evaluation.  Each center is excellently 
run, monitored, and evaluated for efficiency and quality in the information sharing 
process.  As I began the “inspection process” with each center, I started with asking the 
following set of standardized questions of each to get an appreciation of why the center 
was created and how it operates: 
• Why did your state feel compelled to create and fund an information 
fusion center such as this? 
• When information comes into the center, who correlates or triages the 
information?  What are the criteria for this?  How is 
information/intelligence categorized and shared? 
• What is the information architecture at your center?  What happens to the 
information from the time it enters the center to the time it leaves? 
• Who classifies and/or re-classifies information at your center?  What are 
the criteria? 
 8
• How is classified information received, handled, and disseminated?  Is 
there a “Tear-Line” policy?  What are the dissemination guidelines and 
policies for your center? 
• What agencies participate in your center?  Who are the 
stakeholders/recipients?  What is done with information developed that is 
not related to your geographical area? 
• Is your center operational 24/7?  If not, what operational procedures are in 
place for stakeholders to provide or access information at your center 
“after hours”? 
• What kind of intelligence products does your center produce?  How often 
are they offered and how are they disseminated? 
• What type of data bases and computerized connectivity with other 
agencies do you have? 
• What poses the biggest challenge at your center?  What do you need to 




                                                
III. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, ANALYSIS, AND 
INFORMATION SHARING− HOW IS IT WORKING?  A LOOK AT:  
• The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) 
• Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) 
• Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) 
   
A. THE ARIZONA COUNTER TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER 
(ACTIC) 
On October 1, 2004, the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) 
was officially opened and began business as a cross-jurisdictional Watch Center focused 
on enhancing information and intelligence sharing throughout the state of Arizona.6   The 
center was a gubernatorial response to the horrific attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent 
change in which U.S. law enforcement and the intelligence community of the United 
States looked at national and domestic security matters.  Indeed, not only the events of 
9/11, but the many national and international events in the world have caused the U.S. 
Government to re-think the way it looks at homeland security and defense, foreign 
policy, and the relationships between local, state, and federal agencies. 
One significant lesson learned from the events of the last 3 1/2 years is that state 
and local agencies are significant partners in homeland security.  The new “grass roots” 
war against terrorism has to include more connectivity between local, state, and federal 
agencies combining resources and intelligence for the good of all to provide the level of 
national and domestic security demanded by the people of the United States.7 
Immediately following the attacks of 9/11, Arizona, like many other states, had to 
rely on pre-existing emergency response protocols and information infrastructures to 
address local needs.  That infrastructure at the time was based on an emergency response 
architecture based on the national threat levels of the 1990’s and included the following: 
 
6 Lori Norris (Lieutenant, Arizona Department of Public Safety), interview with author, Phoenix, Az., 
February 16, 2005. 
7 The 911 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2004), 353-356. 
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• In 1997, the Division of Emergency Management (DEMA) worked with 
the Department of Public Safety (DPS) to establish a Domestic 
Preparedness Task Force.  The group consisted of representatives from 
more than 40 public and private entities that convened to review 
appropriate response and recovery plans through out the state. 
• The State of Arizona also established a State Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) within DEMA that can be fully activated within one  hour 
(as it was during 9/11).  The EOC brings together all relevant public and 
private entities to address emergency situations. 
• In 1998, DEMA developed a formal Emergency Response and Recovery 
Plan for the entire State of Arizona.  The plan was developed as a 
comprehensive brake-down of the responsibilities of each state agency in a 
major disaster.  The plan was developed with the expectation that it would 
be “practiced” prior to a real emergency or actual crisis event to identify 
weakness and recommend improvements.8 
1. Arizona’s Actions Following 9/11  
Just after the attacks, Arizona officials immediately took steps to bolster their 
state’s emergency preparedness and “brace” themselves for possible additional attacks.  
DPS activated its Domestic Preparedness Operations Center and established a 24 hour tip 
line for individuals to report suspicious activities or concerns.  Additionally, DPS created 
a secure web-site as a vehicle to share information and updates with local and county 
authorities, dedicated additional intelligence analysts and investigators to collect and 
analyze terrorism related information, and appointed more personnel to the FBI’s Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).9 
The U.S. Attorney General (Ashcroft) instructed each United States Attorney 
(USA) to establish multi-jurisdictional anti-terrorism task forces.  In support of this 
request, the Arizona National Guard in Phoenix and Tucson began flying support 
missions for air combat patrols. Also, troops were sent to provide additional security at 
 
8 Janet Napolitano , “ Securing Arizona; A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security,” Arizona 
Governor’s Office, April 23, 2003, www.governor.state.az.us/press/Securing_Arizona.pdf , accessed on 
July 5, 2005. 
9 911 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2004), 353-356.  
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the Hoover Dam and 10 of Arizona’s major airports.  Specially trained ANG and DPS 
personnel were also sent to provide additional security at the Palo Verde Nuclear Plant.10 
To better organize the state’s efforts, then Governor Jane Dee Hull, in 2001, 
appointed two members of her staff to better coordinate Arizona’s contributions to 
homeland security by forming a Homeland Security Council.  The main mission of this 
new council was to oversee all homeland security activities in the state and also develop 
and implement new and effective homeland security policies. 
In December of 2002, Governor-elect Janet Napolitano conducted a thorough 
review of Arizona’s homeland security readiness.  This review found that while the state 
of Arizona took appropriate steps in responding to the events of 9/11, a number of critical 
issues impeded the state’s ability to adequately address issues of homeland security on a 
long term basis.  Some of the critical issues were as follows: 
• Despite the attention from the Governor’s Office with the appointment of 
two homeland security coordinators and the establishment of the new 
Homeland Security Coordinating Council, there was no single person or 
office responsible for organizing the statewide efforts to detect, prevent, 
and respond to terrorist attacks or other critical incidents; 
• The state lacked a long term homeland security strategic plan that 
provided a clear vision of how it will work with county, local, and tribal 
governments to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of terrorism and other 
critical incidents; 
• The data information systems used by federal, state, local, and tribal 
public safety entities were not linked and therefore unable to pass valuable 
information to identify trends and suspicious circumstances that may be 
indicative of an emerging terrorist threat or attack. 
• The state had under-funded resources for anti-terrorism initiatives; 
• The state did not have an electronic disease surveillance system capable of 
identifying an emerging biological or chemical weapons attack through 
the analysis of emergency room and other relevant data; 
 
 
10 Janet Napolitano, “Securing Arizona; A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security,” Arizona 
Governor’s Office, April 23, 2003,www.governor.state.az.us/press/Securing_Arizona.pdf , accessed on 
July 5, 2005. 
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• First responder’s throughout the state all use different and independent 
radio systems that operate on different radio frequencies and do not allow 
them to communicate between agencies.11 
Governor Napolitano’s review also found that there was no comprehensive plan that 
focused on homeland security initiatives focusing on U.S. - Mexican Border issues which 
are considered a major vulnerability for the state.   
Based on these findings, the State of Arizona developed a plan of action for 
establishing a long-term, fiscally prudent approach to homeland security.  This plan 
provided a framework for enhancing the state’s ability to detect, prevent, and respond to 
future acts of terrorism (or other critical incidents); it will also be a useful tool for system 
planning, future technology acquisitions and prioritizing and coordinating requests for 
state and federal funding.12 
2. Improving Arizona’s Ability to Respond to Attack 
After reviewing the report, Governor Napolitano directed the state’s Homeland 
Security Coordinating Council to implement a number of action items to correct the 
noted deficiencies previously identified, below are several that pertain to the ACTIC: 
Action Item #1  The state will appoint a Homeland Security Director to 
coordinate statewide efforts to detect, prevent, and respond to acts of 
terrorism and other critical incidents and expand the role of county, local, 
and tribal officials in strategic planning activities. 
Despite the appointment of two homeland security coordinators and a Homeland 
Security Coordinating Council by Governor Hull, there was no single person or office 
held accountable for organizing the statewide efforts associated with terrorism prevention 
or response.  This has negatively affected Arizona’s ability to coordinate the various 
operational and strategic planning efforts critical to the state’s homeland security mission 
and to develop and communicate a clear strategic vision pertaining to homeland security 
for county and local entities. 
 
11 Janet Napolitano, “Securing Arizona; A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security,” Arizona 
Governor’s Office, April 23, 2003, www.governor.state.az.us/press/Securing_Arizona.pdf , accessed on 
July 5, 2005. 
12 Ibid., 9-11. 
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In an effort to improve the coordination between all levels of government and the 
private sector, Arizona has established a permanent position of Homeland Security 
Director to be an advisor to the governor on homeland security issues and oversee the 
state’s overall homeland security mission.  The governor has also appointed a new 
Homeland Security Coordinating Council that will ensure representation of local, tribal, 
and private sector officials in homeland security strategic planning activities. 
Action Item #2  The State will update and enhance its Emergency 
Response and Recovery Plan 
In accordance with Arizona Revised Statues (ARS), title 26, Chapter 2, Article 1, 
the State of Arizona is required to prepare to respond to emergencies and disasters in 
order to save lives and protect public health and property.  In the late 1990s the state did 
develop such a plan that addressed such issues as mutual aid, financial management, 
responsibilities of state departments, and transportation.  While the state had some 
mention and description for response to a number of specific hazardous situations (such 
as bio-terrorism and WMD) the plan lacked specificity and clarity for roles and 
responsibilities of the state.  The plan also lacked clarity as to how many of the 
stakeholders in the state would be linked into this plan along with other state agencies 
and tribal governments. 
The governor of Arizona therefore, mandated an update on the state’s emergency 
response plan and directed several initiatives requiring annual evaluations and review of 
the state’s readiness for such an event.  Among those mentioned in the directive was a 
comprehensive statewide threat and vulnerability assessment that identifies potential 
targets and areas of concern.  This assessment includes an analysis of potential targets for 
attack, such as buildings, power plants, transportation centers, and fuel storage facilities, 
as well as detailed response plans that include how federal, state, local, and tribal 
agencies will work together to respond to critical and WMD incidents.  To facilitate this 
plan, the state focused its attention on developing a way of sharing relevant portions of 
the assessment on an ongoing basis with state, local, tribal, and private entities so that 
critical assets and infrastructures can be protected. 
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Action #3  The State of Arizona will take steps to establish a statewide 
integrated justice system that links the information systems used by 
federal, state, local, and tribal criminal justice entities in such a way to 
support the identification of emerging terrorism related trends. 
The state set improving information technology and infrastructure that supports 
criminal justice activities as a top priority.  The state planners recognized that rapid, 
consistent access to informational databases at all levels of government was critical to 
accomplish this goal.  Currently, over thirty-eight states in the United States have begun 
efforts to create “integrated justice information systems” that link various components of 
the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections) to each other that allows for the 
rapid transfer of information about criminal activities and the places they occur.  Law 
enforcement officials and policy makers will be able to identify suspicious and unusual 
trends and develop information-driven trends, which allow for information-driven 
strategies that effectively target people and criminal activities.13   
It will be a priority of the state to link the independent information systems used 
by city, county, tribal, and state criminal justice entities to allow for the rapid flow of 
information about the people who commit crimes and the places they occur.  This 
information sharing will support efforts by law enforcement to identify suspicious trends 
and effectively target those involved in criminal activity.  Public safety information links 
is a good start but Arizona wanted additional connectivity with other government systems 
including those that support transportation, public health, social services, and public 
utilities.  State, local, and tribal agencies work with one another daily but often this work 
is stove piped in individual agency systems and policy measures.  As part of the 
homeland security measure, the State of Arizona began taking steps to link public safety 
information systems with non-public safety information systems in order to: 
• Support multi-disciplinary, proactive, and community focused activities; 
• Provide predictive analysis and capabilities; and 
• Improve the delivery of emergency and non emergency services.14 
 
13 Janet Napolitano, “Securing Arizona; A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security,” Arizona 
Governor’s Office, April 23, 2003, www.governor.state.az.us/press/Securing_Arizona.pdf , accessed on 
July 5, 2005. 
14 Ibid. 
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Action Item # 4  The state will establish a 24-hour intelligence and 
information analysis center that will serve as a central hub to facilitate the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime and terrorism related 
information. 
One of the most serious challenges affecting homeland security is the timely 
exchange of intelligence and critical information among local, state, and federal agencies.  
Accurate and timely intelligence is the key to the most fundamental responsibility of a 
government protecting its citizens and critical infrastructures.  Determined to ensure this 
free interchange of information, the Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) was 
designated by the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office to be the central point of 
disseminating information generated by the federal agencies.  
Since 9/11, DPS continued this service to various agencies throughout Arizona by 
email, fax, National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) and a 
secure website.  As a result, DPS expanded its capabilities to provide additional support 
to a growing stakeholder base.  To accommodate this expanded duty, DPS immediately 
took steps to establish the Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC).  This 
center is operating on a twenty-four hour basis providing intelligence and support to 
local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies as well as other agencies addressing 
homeland security needs.  The ACTIC has a focused responsibility for the following: 
• Providing tactical and strategic intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination support to local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies; 
• Maintaining and disseminating an on-going threat analysis for the State of 
Arizona and its critical infrastructure; 
• Providing informational support to the Governor and other critical 
governmental leaders; 
• Maintaining a secure web site to disseminate intelligence and critical 
information accessible to all law enforcement and first responder agencies; 
• Maintaining the Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (ATIX) secure web 
site portal for the dissemination and exchange of information to law 
enforcement and public and private stakeholder agencies that support 
homeland security efforts; 
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• Functioning as the state’s central point of dissemination for homeland 
security threat level conditions and other information generated by the 
FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office and other state, local, tribal, and federal 
agencies; 
• Maintaining and updating the necessary databases to support on-going 
investigations; 
• Maintaining contact with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, the U. S. 
Attorney’s Office of Anti-Terrorism Task Force, and other state, local, and 
federal law enforcement agencies in on-going investigations; 
• Providing necessary training on intelligence function and the role of law 
enforcement and private citizenry in guarding against terrorist attacks. 
The ACTIC was developed to meet the demands of the above action items and be 
more responsive to the needs of law enforcement in its fight to protect America’s 
homeland.  Like all of the existing information/intelligence fusion centers operating in 
the country today, the ACTIC is a work in progress.  The ACTIC is designed to be a true 
cross-jurisdictional partnership, integrating local, state, and federal law enforcement and 
first responders, emergency management and, when appropriate, the private sector. 
3. Mission Statement 
The mission of the ACTIC is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of 
Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies.  Mission execution will be guided by the 
understanding the key to effectiveness is the development and sharing of information 
between participants to the fullest extent as is permitted by law or agency policy.15 
4. How the ACTIC Works 
a. Organizational Structure 
The ACTIC is comprised of integrated groups (squads) consisting of 
sworn (law enforcement) and non-sworn (analytical) personnel from participating local, 
state, and federal agencies who have been assigned to a specific terrorism or criminal 
category.  The operational lay-out of the ACTIC is divided into two parts as mandated by 
federal guidelines.  The first area consists of local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agency personnel on temporary duty assignments with direct liaison to their home 
 
15 Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center Information Bulletin, “Arizona Intelligence Bulletin 
Report,” November 2004, 1. 
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agency.  These assignments are critical as these personnel provide first hand and timely 
information that address community concerns utilizing ACTIC resources.  The people 
assigned to the “local side of the ACTIC” provide and important local connection with 
state agencies that allows for information sharing in a two sided fashion. 
The second side of the ACTIC is comprised of personnel assigned to the 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  The members of the JTTF are also individuals 
who come from local, state, and federal agencies and who also have additional training 
and clearances to work with and analyze classified information.  The JTTF is also 
organized into squads by investigative category.  Personnel assigned to the JTTF are 
sworn Agents, Detectives, and Analysts with security clearances based on the needs and 
priorities of the participating agency and the JTTF.  The JTTF allows for “High-Side 
information” (classified) to be collected, analyzed, “scrubbed”, and then disseminated for 
local use.  Classified information needing to be passed to the other side is done so by 
members with clearances and have a need to know.  Over 95% of the information 
received or collected, however is non-classified information.  The JTTF side of the 
ACTIC allows for the important federal and national information sharing to occur that 
has direct local and state impact for the State of Arizona.    
The ACTIC is organized into two operational components that coincide 
with overall mission responsibilities.  The first component is criminal intelligence which 
focuses its attention on crime prevention.  The intelligence side of the ACTIC utilizes its 
information gathering, analysis, and dissemination efforts in a proactive way so as to 
assess, interdict, prevent, and discourage criminal activities.  This proactive approach 
also has a huge counter terrorism focus as well which involves information gathering 
from a variety of sources including the collection of “soft” information.  The ACTIC 
defines soft information as information which typically can’t be used in court because it 
is derived from hearsay, rumors, anonymous tips, suggestions, and hunches that are all 
used in the development of intelligence files.  Many times, this soft information is 
developed to a point where a criminal or terrorist investigation can be opened.16 
 
16 Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center Information Bulletin, “Arizona Intelligence Bulletin 
Report,” November 2004, 1. 
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The investigative component acts in a strictly reactive mode designed to 
arrest and prosecute the criminal offender.  The investigative side focuses its attention on 
identifying suspects and witnesses, recovering stolen property, and procuring viable 
evidence for court presentation.  This investigative side focuses its attention on the more 
immediate, short term criminal issues affecting state and local jurisdictions in Arizona.  
Both sides of the ACTIC work in close harmony with the Arizona FBI Field Office 
squads working parallel federal issues or where a particular criminal matter could best be 
prosecuted either federally or locally.  
The ACTIC operates in a non-classified information sharing mode.  
Generally, information is characterized as “For Official use Only” (FOUO) or “Law 
Enforcement Sensitive.”  Sensitive or classified information is vetted through the local 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) to members of the ACTIC with appropriate 
clearances.  Classified information needing to be disseminated to a broad based law 
enforcement population is “scrubbed” in the JTTF and appropriately disseminated in as 
timely a fashion as can be done.   The ACTIC is divided into various sections to address a 
specific intelligence/information functions, the following are the ones most useful in 
information sharing: 
b. Intake/Watch Section 
The Intake/Watch Section is the central location for all information 
coming into the ACTIC.  In conception, this section is designed to be a twenty-four hour, 
seven-day operating facility to take all incoming information.  Currently, this section is 
not operational 24/7 but is moving quickly in that direction to provide more immediate 
response to local, state, and federal shareholders.   
ACTIC managers require all personnel to serve rotating shifts in the 
Intake/Watch Section to educate personnel on the over-all mission, role, and 
responsibilities of the ACTIC.  Assigned personnel are responsible for receiving and 
routing telephone calls, processing mail, managing informal and formal requests for 
information, and inputting information into the ACTIC database.  The Intake/Watch 
personnel also promote information sharing using state of the art technology, databases to 
support law enforcement activities.  These people working in this section are also 
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responsible monitoring all sources of media, intelligence sources, database maintenance, 
and homeland security resources for the immediate and timely identification of incidents 
and patterns affecting Arizona.17 
c. Criminal Investigations Research Unit (CIRU) 
The CIRU functions as a gateway to a variety of law enforcement and 
commercial data bases as a resource for all shareholders.  This unit queries open source 
documents, proprietary, law enforcement, and classified information that can be exploited 
in the development and management of general intelligence, the detection and prevention 
of terrorism, the investigation of criminal offenses and the identification of individuals.  
The CIRU is the heart of the intelligence search engine at the ACTIC.18 
d. The Field Intelligence Group (FIG) 
The FIG serves as a central liaison point for coordination of local 
intelligence and investigative matters between federal, state, and local agencies.  The FIG 
serves as a bridge between the federal and local law enforcement investigations.  The 
FIG, as currently organized, is law enforcement based and focuses on issues that 
primarily have an FBI nexus.  The purpose of the Phoenix FBI’s FIG is to support the 
ACTIC as a centralized intelligence management structure in addressing the intelligence 
needs and priorities of the geographical boundaries of the Phoenix FBI Field Office.  One 
of the main functions of the Phoenix FIG is to provide analytical reports to State and 
Federal Executive Managers, FBI Headquarters, and the U.S. Intelligence Community, as 
well as, local, state, federal, and foreign law enforcement agencies.   
It is hoped that the information provided will help policy makers and 
senior state and local officials with appropriate decision-making tools.  This mission is 
accomplished in a coordinated and synchronized approach using the following six step 
method:  1.) Requirements are identified information needs, what we must know to 
safeguard the nation.  2.) Planning and Direction is the management of the entire effort, 
from identifying the need for information to delivering an intelligence product to a 
 
17 Gil Orantego (FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Supervisor), interview with author, Phoenix, Az, 
March 16, 2005. 
18 Ibid. 
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consumer.  3.) Collection is the gathering of raw information based on requirements.  4.) 
Processing and Exploitation involves converting the vast amount of information 
collected to a form usable by analysts.  5.) Analysis and Production is the conversion of 
raw information into intelligence.  6.) Dissemination is the last step, which directly 
responds to the first cycle, is the distribution of raw or finished intelligence to the 
consumers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements.19 
e. Analytical Units 
The primary function of the analytical units is to conduct intelligence-
based assessments of threats and vulnerabilities within the borders of Arizona.  The 
analytical unit identifies and monitors known and suspected terrorists and groups, analyze 
terrorist activities and produce strategic and action-oriented intelligence data for the 
benefit of policy makers, administrators and managers.  Analysts contribute to daily 
intelligence reports and routinely publish their findings for state-wide law enforcement 
distribution.  All of the personnel assigned to these units are screened and vetted for the 
necessary security clearances allowing for a coordinated and collaborative exchange.  
Secret and Top Secret are the highest classifications needed but most information 
collected and disseminated is at the non-classified, law enforcement sensitive level.   
The Analytical section of the ACTIC is divided into two parts:  1.) 
Strategic Analysis−this group researches, studies, and publishes analytical results for 
long term planning of ACTIC operations, and intelligence and investigative objectives.  
2.) Tactical Analysis – This group researches and analyzes information with/for on-
going intelligence and investigative objectives of the operational squads assigned to the 
ACTIC and to the other investigative bureaus of the Arizona DPS.  These analysts, along 
with other law enforcement personnel try to identify any potential terrorism link in the 
other criminal activities being investigated.  Some of the criminal activity leading to such 
a connection includes auto theft, fraud, identity theft, narcotics trafficking, gambling, 
organized crime, and financial crimes. 
 
 
19 Gil Orantego (FBI JTTF Supervisor), interview with author, Phoenix, Az, March 16, 2005. 
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f. Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
The FBI’s JTTF in Arizona is responsible for providing investigative and 
operational support for terrorism cases.  The JTTF accomplishes that mission by joining 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in a coordinated manner to detect, 
deter, prevent, and investigate acts of terrorism that threaten the United States national 
interest at home or abroad.  The JTTF is an integral part of the ACTIC and is housed 
within the same building.  The JTTF is the main repository for any classified information 
received and can “scrub” this information making it suitable for appropriate 
dissemination to units within the ACTIC. 
g. Intelligence Squads 
The intelligence squads are part of an ad hoc task force comprised of state, 
local, and federal law enforcement analysts.  They are responsible for providing follow-
up support to all information received into the ACTIC.  In addition, each agency 
representative is tasked with coordinating with their home agency to identify any 
homeland security concerns within their communities.  These squads, in coordination 
with the appropriate Analytical Unit, monitor all terrorist and extremist organizations that 
impact the State of Arizona, its citizens, and the nation.  Analysts in this squad are 
responsible for the development of organizational profiles on all terrorist organizations 
that impact the State of Arizona and the nation. 
The ACTIC also has sub-intelligence squads which include:  1.) Critical 
Infrastructure Assignments refers to personnel assigned to address critical 
infrastructure concerns. They will identify, monitor, and conduct risk and vulnerability 
assessments of the various infrastructure sites within the State of Arizona.  2.) Public 
Health and Biological Threats Assignments are personnel assigned to this sub-unit to 
focus on identifying, monitoring, and conducting risk and vulnerability assessments 
concerning public health threats posed by chemical and biological hazards.  This group 
also focuses on detecting and preventing terrorists attacks that involve or threaten the use 
of chemical or biological weapons.  This sub-unit works closely with the Arizona 
Department of Emergency Management, the Center for Disease Control, the Poison 
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Control Center, public health agencies, and private health care providers to accomplish 
this task. 
h. Hazardous Material Weapons of Mass Destruction Unit 
(HazMatWMD) 
The HazMat/WMD Unit was created to identify, monitor, and conduct risk 
and vulnerability assessments pertaining to the movement, storage, and destruction of 
weapons of mass destruction and radiological material within the State of Arizona.  This 
Unit has responsibility for detecting and preventing terrorist acts that use or threatens the 
use of WMDs.  All personnel assigned to the HazMat/WMD Unit have obtained all 
necessary security clearances to coordinate and share information across units.   
i. Liaison Squad 
The Liaison Unit is responsible for establishing and developing liaison 
contact with local, state, federal, and private agencies and promoting ACTIC’s purpose 
and mission.  This Unit also provides training on the method and benefits of passing 
information to the Center and suggestions on how to combat terrorist activities and 
criminal acts.  The Liaison Unit also has a sub-section which coordinates and tracks 
ACTIC automation systems and training in terrorism prevention and ensures that all 
ACTIC personnel are current in training and certifications.20   
All of the units, sections, and personnel at the ACTIC are organized and 
trained for one function; to work in harmony with existing law enforcement and private 
sector agencies in protecting the citizens of Arizona against terrorist attacks.  Like all 
new endeavors, there are always “rough edges” to smooth out before the system is 
working right, the ACTIC has put together a well thought out and organized approach to 
fighting crime and terror, an excellent model for any state to follow. 
j. ACTIC Information Flow 
Information at the ACTIC is collected and disseminated using a web based 
program called the “Watch Log Entry System” (WLE) that manages the collection, 
assignment, update, and disposition of incoming information and events.  The WLE 
distributes a threat warning and report feature to all approved shareholders within the 
 
20 Lori Norris (Lieutenant, Arizona Department of Public Safety), interview with author, Phoenix, Az, 
February 16, 2005. 
state of Arizona.  This particular feature of WLE allows for better coordination of 
information and resources within the statewide public safety community for a faster and 
more integrated response.  The ACTIC-WLE improves the overall availability, quality, 
and quantity of watch and threat information available throughout the Arizona Public 
Safety community.    
 
 
Figure 1.   Provided by the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center, this 
is an informational flow chart design for the ACTIC depicting how 
information is accepted and handled at the center. 
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k. WLE Roles/Responsibilities 
Intake Personnel − Personnel who creates a watch log event using in-
coming information received from law enforcement, general public referrals, media, and 
private sector sources.  The intake personnel enter the information into the data base 
which then makes the information searchable.  Multiple intake personnel can up-date or 
modify information from other intake personnel. 
Operations Supervisor − This position supervises all responsibility for 
the watch log events relating to their area of expertise.  This is the only person who has 
authority to create a watch log event, assign an event to another supervisor, refer to 
another shareholder or agency, and authorize an intelligence report to be written from a 
watch log event(s). 
General User − Any authorized ACTIC member is a general user and has 
the ability to pass, receive, update, or report on a watch log event.  A general user can 
also refer an event to another general user and create an intelligence report based on a 
watch log event.21   
l. WLE Events 
Drafts − The initial state of a watch log event created by intake personnel 
or an operational supervisor.  A new watch log event still being formulated with initial 
information and details is considered a “draft.”  Events in the draft stage are not 
searchable and only the intake personnel or operations supervisors can view a draft.  
Once all of the initial information and details have been gathered and reported, the event 
can then be submitted into the system.  The submit action moves an event into an “open 
state” which then makes it searchable for shareholders. 
Open − A watch log event that contains all of the initial incident 
information and has been submitted into the system by the intake personnel or 
supervisors.  General users/shareholders are able to modify or up-date any part of the 
open watch log event. 
 
21 Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center Training Class, “Watch Log Entry System Training 
Class,” v1.0, Lockheed Martin, November 1, 2004, 6-7. 
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Locked − A completed watch log event that cannot be updated.  Events 
that are in the “locked” mode can only have information added if the operations 
supervisor unlocks the event and then submits the new information.22 
As a nation, the United States has a unilateral commitment to the safety of 
the country and its citizenry.  To accomplish this task, federal, state, and local 
governments, law enforcement, and state agencies (public and private) must all work 
together to eliminate the need of utilizing ineffective and random prevention strategies 
and to focus on new ways to address national security.    
The State of Arizona has made a commitment to work with city, county, 
local tribal and private sector entities and to put into place the necessary information, 
communications technology, and operational strategies that support the government’s 
efforts to keep Americans safe.  The state leadership of Arizona has worked hard in 
developing a statewide strategy to protect its people utilizing the cooperative efforts of all 
of the groups previously mentioned.23  The ACTIC plays a major part in this objective, 
judging from its operational effectiveness, the ACTIC well serves the people of Arizona 
and is a worthy model for other states, contemplating the development such a center. 
B. THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER 
(GISAC) 
Like most states in the after-math of September 11, 2001, state leaders looked at 
their own vulnerabilities and matched those against their available resources.  In response 
to the terrorist attacks, Georgia’s Governor Roy Barnes created the Georgia Homeland 
Security Task Force (GHSTF) to devise and implement a homeland security strategy to 
protect Georgia citizens and infrastructure from terrorist attacks.  The GHSTF’s first 
priority was to initiate the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) 
project in support of the GHSTF’s broader mission, encompassing intelligence analysis, 
planning, crisis management, and consequence management, to secure the State of 
 
22  Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center Training Class, “Watch Log Entry System Training 
Class Manual,” v1.0, Lockheed Martin, November 1, 2004, 6-7. 
23 Janet Napolitano, “Securing Arizona; A Roadmap for Arizona Homeland Security,” Arizona 
Governor’s Office, April 23, 2003, www.governor.state.az.us./press/Securing_Arizona.pdf, accessed on 
July 5, 2005.  
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Georgia from terrorist threats and attacks.  GISAC was officially created on October 25, 
2001 and is one of only a few of state-level agencies dedicated solely to homeland 
security, antiterrorism, and counter-terrorism operations.  Governor Barnes’ successor, 
Governor Sonny Perdue, further developed the GISAC by designating it to be a primary 
component of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security. 
1. Mission 
The mission assigned to the GISAC project was to serve as the focal point for the 
collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism intelligence information 
relating to Georgia.  GISAC was not intended to replace or duplicate the counter-
terrorism duties of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, but rather to enhance and 
facilitate the collection of intelligence information from local and state sources, and to 
integrate that intelligence information into a system that will benefit homeland security 
and counter-terrorism programs at all levels.24 
Soon after it began operations, GISAC established itself as the state’s 
clearinghouse for terrorism-related intelligence information.  It quickly developed 
protocols and relationships that enhanced its capabilities for the gathering, assessment, 
analysis, exchange, and dissemination of intelligence information between local, state, 
and federal government agencies; corporate security executives; and the private sector 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure assets. 
Additionally, under the provisions of the Antiterrorism Act (OCGA 35-3-60), 
the Antiterrorism Training Act (OCGA 16-11-150), and Georgia Bureau of 
Investigation (GBI) Investigative Division Directive 8-8-18, in the State of Georgia, 
GISAC has the primary responsibility for developing and evaluating information about 
persons and/or organizations engaged in terrorist activities, investigating terrorist 
activities, and liaising with GBI work-units and other law enforcement agencies engaged 
in counter-terrorism operations and investigations25.   
 
24 Robert I. Hardin, “Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center Information Intake and 
Management,” Georgia Homeland Security Task Force/GISAC Directive # 03-002, Atlanta, Ga, January 1, 
2003, 1-2. 
25 Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Title 16, Atlanta, Georgia, 2003, 
www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2003_04/hinfo/wrap4c.htm, accessed on June 18, 2005.. 
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The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) categorizes terrorism as either 
domestic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorists.  
The GISAC has adopted the following FBI definitions for use in their daily operations: 
• Domestic Terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or 
violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the 
United State or its territories without foreign direction committed against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social 
objectives. 
• International Terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any 
state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or any state.  These acts appear to be 
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a 
government by assassination or kidnapping.  International terrorist acts 
occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms 
of the means by which they are accomplished, the person they appear 
intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which the perpetrators 
operate or seek asylum. 
2. Definitions 
For the operational purposes, the GISAC has also incorporated the following 
definitions: 
• Terrorist Act − An act which constitutes a crime against the person or 
against the residence of an individual (1) which is committed with the 
specific intent of and may reasonably be expected to instill fear into such 
person or persons or (2) which is committed for the purpose of restraining 
that person or those persons from exercising their rights under the 
Constitution and laws of this state and the United States and (3) any illegal 
act directed at other persons or their property because of those persons’ 
beliefs or political affiliations (OCGA 35-3-60). 
• Terrorist Attack − Any terrorist act or incident attempted or perpetrated 
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the 
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives. 
• Terrorist Incident − A violent act or an act dangerous to human life, in 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of any state, to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives (FBI).   
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• Suspected Terrorist Incident − A potential act of terrorism for which 
responsibility cannot be attributed to a known or suspected terrorist group.  
Assessment of the circumstances surrounding the incident determines its 
inclusion in this category (FBI). 
• Terrorism Prevention − A documented instance in which a violent act by a 
known or suspected terrorist group or individual with the means and a 
proven propensity for violence is successfully interdicted through 
investigative activity (FBI) 
• Terrorism Intelligence Information − information historical, strategic, 
and/or tactical, that is pertinent to:  1.) the identification of persons, 
groups, or organizations that commit terrorist attacks, or are engaged in 
activities in support of, or in preparation for, terrorist attacks;  2.) the 
investigation of specific terrorist attacks by local, state, or federal law 
enforcement agencies, and the identification, arrest, and prosecution of the 
perpetrators of such acts or incidents; and 3.) the prediction and 
subsequent prevention of terrorist attacks through collection, integration, 
investigation, evaluation, and sharing of such information.   
Additionally, Terrorism Intelligence Information involves circumstances that 
establish sufficient facts to give a trained law-enforcement or criminal investigative 
agency, officer, investigator, or employee a basis to believe that there is reasonable 
possibility that an individual or organization is involved in terrorist activities. 
• Antiterrorism Act − OCGA 35-3-60 – a law enacted by the Georgia 
General Assembly to “assist law enforcement personnel in the State of 
Georgia to identify, investigate, arrest, and prosecute individuals or groups 
of individuals who illegally threaten, harass, terrorize, or otherwise injure 
or damage the person or property of persons on the basis of their race, 
national origin, or religious persuasion.”, and to establish “a special 
Antiterrorism Task Force within the Georgia Bureau of Investigation.” 
• Threat Assessment − the process of gathering and assessing information 
about persons, groups, or organizations, which may have the interest, 
motive, intention, and capability of perpetrating terrorist attacks.  Most 
often, the term refers to the process of assessing certain information and 
circumstances in order to determine the probability that an actual terrorist 
attack is occurring, or is imminent.   
• GISAC Intelligence Request − An inquiry for information available 
through the GISAC Terrorism Intelligence System.  The requester must be 
a GISAC Participant or member of a GISAC Participating Agency, and 
must provide a reason for the query that meets GISAC mission criteria. 
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• Need to Know − Any GISAC Participant or member of a GISAC 
Participating Agency has a need to know when information requested will 
aid in the assessment of terrorism intelligence. 
• Right to Know − Any GISAC Participant or member of a GISAC 
Participating Agency; as well as government officials whose agencies may 
be involved in incident response and/or consequence management; and 
managers of businesses and organizations, when their business or 
organization  is specifically identified as a target of terrorist activity has a 
right to know when information received will aid in the assessment of 
terrorism threat information or terrorism intelligence. 
• Right to know − when information received will aid in the assessment of 
terrorism threat information or terrorism intelligence. 
• Reasonable Suspicion of Terrorist Activity − A set of circumstances 
that establishes sufficient facts to give a trained law-enforcement or 
criminal investigative agency, officer, investigator, or employee a basis to 
believe that there is reasonable possibility that an individual or 
organization is involved in terrorist activities. 
3. Participants 
State agencies and organizations that directly participating in the GISAC include: 
• Georgia Office of Homeland Security (GOHS) 
• Georgia Homeland Security Task Force (GHSTF) 
• Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) 
• Georgia State Patrol (GSP) 
• Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) 
• Georgia Department of Defense / Georgia National Guard (GANG) 
• Georgia Sheriff's Association (GSA) 
• Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police (GACP) 
• Georgia Association of Fire Chiefs (GAFC) 
The manner of participation of each the several State agencies and organizations 
in the GISAC project varies according to each agencies resources, expertise, and related 
responsibilities. Currently, GISAC’s day-to-day operations, facilities, personnel, 
finances, and administration are managed by GBI supervisors. 




• US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) − Washington, DC 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) − Atlanta 
• Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) − Atlanta 
4. Staffing 
GISAC is currently staffed by state-level law enforcement and homeland security 
agencies and organizations that include a total personnel roster of 18 individuals: 
• Georgia Bureau of Investigation 
• Inspectors – 1 
• Special Agents in Charge – 1 
• Assistant Special Agents in Charge – 1 
• Special Agents – 5 
• Intelligence Analysts – 2 
• Investigative Assistant –1  
• Georgia State Patrol 
• Investigators – 1 
• Georgia Emergency Management Agency 
• Critical Infrastructure Analysts − 2 
• Georgia National Guard / Department of Defense 
• Intelligence Analysts – 1 
• Georgia Sheriff’s Association 
• Investigators/Agents – 1 
• Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police 
• Investigators/Agents – 1 
• Georgia Association of Fire Chiefs 
• Investigators/Agents – 1 
Salary, vehicle, equipment, and supply expenses associated with GISAC 
personnel are born by their respective employing agencies.  The facilities and furnishings, 
including computer and communications equipment, are funded by grants and 




5. Duties and Responsibilities 
GISAC’s principal duties and responsibilities can be categorized as follows: 
• Collection, analysis, and sharing of terrorism intelligence information; 
• Terrorist threat assessment and monitoring; 
• Terrorist incident response; 
• Development and implementation of special projects, strategies, and 
initiatives. 
Terrorism Intelligence:  The primary function of GISAC is to collect, integrate 
(“fuse”), investigate, evaluate, and share information pertaining to possible terrorist 
activities in Georgia, for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks from occurring or, if 
they do occur, to mitigate their consequences and extract useful information from the 
ensuing investigation.  
As information is received at GISAC, it is initially documented by GISAC 
investigators and analysts, and then immediately evaluated by GBI supervisors, who 
filter, classify, and disseminate it.  When appropriate, GISAC supervisors assign GISAC 
personnel to conduct follow-up investigation and analysis. 
After review by GBI supervisors, the “raw” terrorism intelligence information is 
forwarded to GISAC’s GEMA, GANG, GSA, GACP, and GAFC representatives, who 
review it within the context of their own particular areas of interest and responsibility.  
 The GEMA, GANG, GSA, GACP, and GAFC representatives may subsequently 
recommend certain actions to GISAC supervisors and/or their own agency/organization 
managers in order to disrupt or prevent possible terrorist attacks, or to mitigate and 
manage the consequences of an attack. 
Terrorism intelligence information collected by GISAC is initially documented on 
the GISAC Activity Log, access to which is restricted to GISAC personnel.  When 
deemed appropriate by GBI/GISAC supervisors, GISAC agents and/or analysts are 
assigned to conduct follow-up investigations, research, and analyses regarding the raw 
information in order to better determine its credibility, accuracy, and relevancy, and to 
gather additional relevant information.  Terrorism intelligence information that meets the 
criteria of the GBI’s Criminal Intelligence System is entered as an Intelligence Report 
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into that system.  Investigations that arise from terrorism intelligence information are 
documented in the GBI Case Management System as Assistance Rendered, Terrorism or 
Intelligence investigations.  The GBI Criminal Intelligence and Case Management 
Systems are operated in compliance with 28 CFR rules and regulations, and its data is 
available for query and analysis by approved law enforcement agencies / personnel in 
Georgia, as well as certain other states. 
GISAC publishes and distributes a monthly terrorism-intelligence bulletin for 
state and local law enforcement and public safety agencies, homeland security officials, 
and other “need to know” entities.  The GISAC Intelligence Bulletin summarizes 
statewide activities and concerns, and provides relevant information from local, state, and 
federal sources. 
GISAC maintains a pager-based communications system, through which it can 
instantaneously communicate terrorism alerts, updates, and notifications to key public 
safety, homeland security, and emergency management officials throughout the state.  
Currently, the GISAC is not operational 24 hours a day but can be accessed thru 911 
dispatchers and on-call GISAC personnel can be called or paged for immediate response 
if needed. 
Terrorist Threat Assessment:  A secondary, but critical role of GISAC that is 
interrelated with the terrorism intelligence collection and analysis process is its terrorist 
threat assessment function.  Occasionally, information reported to GISAC, or information 
developed through subsequent investigation and analysis, will indicate that a terrorist 
attack may be underway, or imminent.  On those occasions, GISAC personnel use all 
available resources in an effort to quickly and effectively evaluate the credibility of the 
information, develop additional relevant information, and notify response agencies and 
other appropriate entities in hopes of preventing or disrupting the attack or, at least, 
mitigating its consequences.   
The procedure used to assess terrorist threat information is a unique investigative 
process that involves conventional investigative methods, as well as more technical 
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research methods that utilize queries of both open and restricted databases, and computer 
analyses.  Essentially, threat assessment is a three-component process: 
• Identify – identification of persons, groups, or organizations that have the 
interest, motive, and capability to perpetrate terrorist attacks. 
• Investigate / Evaluate – assessment of persons, groups, or organizations 
who are identified as potential terrorist threats.  Through Manage – 
implement an appropriate response to the threat (i.e. refer to JTTF, 
continue to investigate or monitor, disseminate warnings or alerts, etc). 
Terrorist Incident Response:  If and when there is a terrorist attack, involving 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or that otherwise results in significant damage, 
casualties, and/or disruption, in Georgia, or if large-scale terrorist attacks occur elsewhere 
within the US, GISAC will initiate its Incident Response Protocol (IRP), through which it 
will immediately notify Georgia’s Director of Homeland Security; the JTTF; local and 
state public safety and response agencies, and other potentially affected entities, private 
sector as well as governmental.  Additionally, ancillary response protocols will be 
immediately implemented, with GISAC personnel responding to the incident command 
post; manning GISAC communications systems at the GISAC Intelligence Operations 
Center; maintaining a computerized Incident Tracking System; exchanging incident-
related information with other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies; and 
monitoring the activities of other responding agencies. 
Special Projects, Strategies, and Initiatives:  GISAC was created by the 
GHSTF to develop and implement initiatives they deem to be necessary for the protection 
of Georgia’s citizens from terrorist threats and attacks.  Since its creation, GISAC has 
operated as the single state-level agency dedicated solely to homeland security issues.  
Subsequently, from time to time, GISAC is called upon to utilize its resources to perform 
special projects, develop and implement strategies, and implement initiatives as directed 
by the GHSTF and/or the Director of Homeland Security. 
6. Information Intake & Management 
Information that is collected by GISAC personnel is carefully documented and 
very tightly managed.  Normally, incoming information is documented by GISAC 
personnel on GISAC Activity Report forms.  This form, which may be completed on a 
computer or handwritten, is designed to collect detailed information from the source.  
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Once completed, the GISAC Activity Report is immediately forwarded to a GBI 
supervisor, who will review it, confirm or modify its classification according to type, 
priority, and urgency; and when deemed appropriate, assign it to investigators and/or 
analysts for follow-up action (investigation, research, analysis, or dissemination to other 
agencies or entities).  The information captured on the GISAC Activity Report form is 
later entered into the GISAC Activity Log, which stores details of the information that 
can be queried for operational and administrative purposes.26 
All terrorism intelligence information that meets the submission criteria for the 
GBI’s Criminal Intelligence System is entered as Intelligence Reports into that system.  
When deemed appropriate by GBI/GISAC supervisors, agents and/or analysts are 
assigned to conduct follow-up investigations and analyses regarding the raw information 
in order to better determine its credibility, accuracy, and relevancy, and to gather 
additional relevant information.  When additional research and investigation does not 
demonstrate that submitted information is credible, the information is not retained as 
intelligence information.  Short term, as well as full-scale, investigations that arise from 
terrorism intelligence information are documented in the GBI Case Management System.   
The GBI Criminal Intelligence and Case Management Systems are operated in 
compliance with 28 CFR rules and regulations, and their data is available for query and 
analysis by approved law enforcement agencies / personnel in Georgia, as well as certain 
other states.27 
7. How the Information Flow Works at the GISAC 
The procedure outlined below is how GISAC personnel will document and further 
process information that comes into the Center.  Essentially, the procedure will rely on 
investigative and analytical personnel to initially document the information on a GISAC 
Activity Report form, as the information is received.  After the information is initially 
documented, it will be the responsibility of the GISAC supervisors to review it; confirm 
or modify its classification according to type, priority, and urgency; and when deemed 
 
26 Bob Hardin (Commander, GISAC), interview with author, Atlanta, Ga., February 23, 2005. 
27 Robert I. Hardin, “Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center Information Intake and 
Management,” Georgia Homeland Security Task Force/GISAC Directive # 03-002, Atlanta, Ga, January 1, 
2003, 1-2. 
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appropriate, assign it to investigators and/or analysts for follow-up action (investigation, 
research, analysis, or dissemination to other agencies or entities). 
a. GISAC’S Function 
GISAC’s mission is to serve as the focal point for collection, analysis, 
sharing and dissemination of information relevant to threats or attacks of a terrorist nature 
within and against the State of Georgia, its citizens, or infrastructure.  Thus, it is critically 
important that all incoming information be properly documented and managed so that 
real indicators of actual terrorist activities / attacks can be recognized and referred for 
preventative action and consequence management as quickly as possible.  In order to 
effectively and efficiently recognize and assess terrorist threats, and communicate that 
information to the agencies/persons who should have it, GISAC personnel must diligently 
and aggressively perform their information intake and management roles. 
b. Information Intake  
Terrorism related Information comes in to GISAC personnel through a 
variety of means, including telephone, fax, email, websites, news media outlets, 
publications, mail, and in person.  That information, if possibly related to any terrorism 
issue, domestic or foreign, or to any potential target of a terrorist attack, must be 
immediately documented by the recipient on a GISAC Activity Report form.  A copy of 
the GISAC Activity Report form is attached to this directive.  The template for GISAC 
Activity Report form is electronically maintained on the GISAC server at GISAC1 / 
Data / Forms & Templates, where it can be printed out (blank) and used in making 
handwritten entries on the paper form, or the information can be electronically entered in 
the gray form-fields on the template, and the completed form can then be printed out for  
submission to GISAC supervisors, and an electronic version of the Report will be saved 
to the Activity Reports folder located on the GISAC server at GISAC1 / Data / Activity 
Reports.   
c. GISAC Activity Reports 
The GISAC Activity Report is the entry-portal for all 
information/requests submitted to, or collected by, GISAC personnel.  The various 
labeled blanks, drop-down boxes, and checkboxes are intended to assist the recipient / 
author in obtaining as complete information as possible, and in accurately and quickly 
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classifying that information.  The Report is divided into sections where the author should 
note information for “Subject-Person,” “Subject-Vehicle,”, “Subject-
Business/Organization”, “Target / Focus of Threat,” “GISAC Classification,” and 
“Criminal Activity.”   
The narrative section of the Report is where the author should summarize 
the information/request.  The space allowed for the narrative on the Activity Report form 
is relatively small, and should be used to document only a brief overview of the 
information/request, consisting of only two or three sentences.  GISAC supervisors will 
later rely on that narrative when they enter the Activity Report information in the GISAC 
Activity Logbook. 
The complete and detailed narrative of the information will be 
documented on separate blank pages, which are to be marked with the GISAC Activity 
Report Number (assigned by supervisor) and attached to the completed Activity Report 
form.  Any other documentation that is relevant to the information on the Activity Report 
should be similarly marked with the Activity Report Number and attached.  
The bottom portion of the Activity Report is to aid supervisors with 
routing the information for follow-up action (investigation, research, analysis, etc.) and to 
document any subsequent dissemination of the information.  
When a GISAC Activity Report is completed, it should be immediately 
submitted to a GISAC supervisor.  Upon receiving a GISAC Activity Report, GISAC 
supervisors will, as soon as possible, confirm or modify the classification assigned to the 
Report (in accordance with classification guidelines), and then further process the 
information as determined by the GISAC supervisor, or as indicated by applicable 
GISAC protocols.  GISAC supervisors (or designee) will assign Activity Report Numbers 




28 David Proctor (Special Agent, Georgia Bureau of Investigation), interview with author, Atlanta, 
Ga., February 23, 2005. 
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d. Gisac Activity Report Numbers and Logbook 
The GISAC Activity Logbook will be maintained by GISAC supervisors, 
but will be accessible to all GISAC personnel.  Other guidelines pertaining to the 
assignment of Activity Report Numbers and maintenance of the GISAC Activity 
Logbook are as follows: 
• A three-ring binder will be used as the GISAC Activity Logbook for the 
purpose of maintaining a permanent record of Activity Reports generated 
by GISAC.  Information submitted to, or collected by, GISAC personnel 
will be documented on a GISAC Activity Report form, which will be 
submitted to a GISAC supervisor (or designee), who will then assign the 
Activity Report Number, and make a corresponding entry in the GISAC 
Activity Logbook.  At some point in the future, the GISAC Activity 
Logbook will be created electronically and will be maintained on the 
LAN, with access limited to GISAC personnel. 
• GISAC supervisors (or designee) must assign Activity Report Numbers, 
and direct any follow-up action (investigation, research, analysis, etc.) 
and/or dissemination outside of GISAC.  Such direction may be 
accomplished on a case-by-case basis, or through pre-established 
protocols. 
• Activity Report Numbers will be assigned and logged chronologically by 
fiscal year, July 1st through June 30th.   The first two digits indicating the 
last two digits of the fiscal year followed by a hyphen, and then five more 
digits, which will be the sequential identifier for the Activity Report.  At 
some point in the future, a third series of alphanumerical characters may 
be added to denote the GISAC Classification assigned to the Activity 
Report. 
Each page of the Activity Report Logbook will be divided into nine 
sections as follows: 
Activity Report Numbers will consist of a series of two distinctive 
numerical identifiers.  The first two digits will identify the fiscal year.  
The second series (five digits) will be the sequential identifier for Activity 
Reports initiated by GISAC during the fiscal year. 
Date Initiated should be the date the information/request is received, or 
the earliest date thereafter. 
Author should be the investigator/analyst who originally receives the 
information/request, or who completes the GISAC Activity Report form.  
Classification will be the GISAC classification assigned to the 
information/request by the Author, if approved by the GISAC supervisor, 
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or as ultimately determined by the GISAC supervisor.  If multiple 
activities are involved in the information/request, the GISAC classification 
should be based upon the most significant or serious of those activities. 
Activity Location or Target/Focus of Information will identify the county 
(if in Georgia) most prominently involved in the information/request, the 
location [city, state (if not in Georgia), or country] that is the focus or 
target of the information/request, or the location from which the 
information/request is believed to have originated. 
Activity Description should be two or three sentences describing the 
information/request (the activity).  If multiple activities are involved, the 
description should focus on the most significant or serious activity. 
Person(s) Assigned for Follow-Up Action(s) will be the investigator 
and/or analyst assigned to conduct follow-up investigation, research, 
analysis, or dissemination outside of the Center (if applicable). 
Date Follow-Up Action(s) Assigned will be the date the follow-up 
investigation, research, analysis, or dissemination outside of the Center is 
assigned to the GISAC investigator or analyst. 
Date Follow-Up Action Completed will be the date the follow-up 
investigation, research, analysis, or dissemination outside of the Center is 
accomplished. 
In the GISAC Activity Logbook, a new page will be used to begin each 
month’s entries.  The month and calendar year should be listed at the top of each of the 
pages in the GISAC Activity Logbook. If removed from the GISAC Activity Logbook, 
the Logbook pages will be filed by fiscal year and month.  The folders containing the 
GISAC Activity Logbook pages will be maintained in chronological order in the GISAC 
Case File Cabinet(s). 
e. GISAC Protocols 
The most significant and serious information/requests that come in to 
GISAC will be managed according to very specific and pre-established protocols, which 
will ensure that all of the appropriate persons / agencies are provided the information in a 
timely manner.  Those protocols will require GISAC personnel to make certain 
notifications, and will utilize special forms with checklists on which to document the 
details of those notifications.  The protocol documentation will be attached to and 
maintained with the corresponding GISAC Activity Report.  
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Additionally, with regard to the most significant and serious 
information/requests, certain protocols will be implemented with regard to how GISAC 
personal are to respond.  These response protocols will specify what GISAC personnel 
should do when notified that a terrorist attack has occurred, is underway, or is believed to 
be imminent.  The GISAC protocols will be described and implemented in later GISAC 
Directives. 
• Group Name:  Information Intake Group 
• Group Location:  GISAC “War Room” 
• Group Mission/Objectives:  The Information Intake Group is primarily 
responsible for manning the GISAC telephones and documenting 
information, and requests for information, that are submitted by officials 
and agencies, as well as the general public.  As the information / requests 
are documented on GISAC Activity Forms, they are forwarded to the 
Information Evaluation Group for review and follow-up action, if deemed 
necessary.  Intelligence information submitted to GISAC will be 
integrated with pre-existing intelligence and new intelligence from other 
sources and utilized as tactical intelligence by a variety of public safety 
agencies to manage the terrorist incident, investigation, and consequences. 
f. Intelligence/Alert Dissemination 
The flow of terrorism intelligence and threat information reported “down” 
to GISAC from an official federal governmental source, and then shared by GISAC with 
other governmental and/or private stakeholders: 
• Intelligence/Alert Source:  Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) / Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Department of Defense (DoD), Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Georgia Office of Homeland Security (GAOHS), terrorism 
intelligence and homeland security entities in other cities/states/countries, 
etc. 
• Intelligence/Alert Source notifies GISAC of terrorism related 
intelligence/threat information via electronic, written, or in-person 
communications: 
• In most instances, urgent and/or high-priority terrorism intelligence/threat 
information is initially disseminated to GISAC Supervisors through direct 
face-to-face contact with Atlanta FBI/JTTF Supervisors.  This information 
exchange is facilitated by the fact that GISAC and the Atlanta FBI/JTTF 
are housed on adjacent floors of the same building.  GISAC and FBI/JTTF 
Supervisors subsequently coordinate further dissemination of that 
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intelligence/threat information, as well as their respective operational 
responses.  
• Credible information concerning terrorist threat information is 
immediately assessed by GISAC Supervisors and staff as to what 
persons/organizations should be notified, and by what means.  GISAC 
maintains a list of telephone numbers, pager numbers, and email addresses 
for executive officers and designated points-of-contact for most of 
Georgia’s federal, state, and local public safety agencies, as well as 
members of the Georgia Homeland Security Task Force and Georgia 
Homeland Security Central Command, and security managers at many of 
the state’s critical infrastructure (CI) facilities and key asset/resource (KA-
R) sites.   
The FBI, DHS, and elements of the DoD commonly use secure electronic 
communications systems to disseminate terrorism intelligence/threat information to state 
and local stakeholders.  Those systems include the following: 
• Secure Telephone Unit (STU) – telephone equipped with encryption 
capabilities used for voice communications involving classified 
information, encryption mode can only be accessed with the proper key. 
• STU Fax Machine – operates similar to STU in the transfer of 
information in document form. 
• Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief (HSOMB) – a daily 
electronic document summarizing the previous day’s reporting to DHS’s 
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC); published and 
disseminated by DHS’s Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination (OSLGC) to state and local LE personnel. 
• Homeland Security Information Message (HSIM) – usually a single-
issue, electronic document used by the DHS/HSOC to communicate 
uncorroborated threat information to U.S. government agencies, State and 
Local Homeland Security Advisors, the private sector, and public in an 
expeditious manner;  disseminated via e-mail. 
• Joint DHS/FBI Information Bulletin – usually a single-issue, electronic 
document used by the DHS/HSOC to communicate information to educate 
the counter-terrorism intelligence, homeland security, and law 
enforcement communities about terrorism related issues; usually 
designated as LES or FOUO; disseminated via e-mail. 
• Joint FBI/DHS Intelligence Bulletin – usually a single-issue, electronic 
document used by the DHS/HSOC to provide law enforcement 
personnel/entities with current, relevant terrorism information developed 
from counter-terrorism investigations and analyses, but does not contain 
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threat warning information; usually designated as LES; disseminated via 
e-mail. 
• Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) – Anti-Terrorism 
Information Exchange (ATIX) – secure internet based communications 
system; managed through six regional centers that are funded and 
overseen by US Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of 
Justice Programs; available to local, state, and federal law enforcement 
(LE) personnel. 
• Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) – secure internet based 
communications system available to local, state, and federal LE personnel; 
supports secure e-mail communications between enrolled members; 
managed by FBI. 
• Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) – secure internet 
based communications system; managed by DHS; available to local, state, 
and federal LE personnel. 
• Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) – SouthEast 
Emergency Response Network (SEERN) – secure internet based 
communications system; managed by DHS; uses JRIES platform; will 
integrate two-way, real-time communications of CI/KA-R and other 
private sector stakeholders with government counter-terrorism intelligence 
and homeland security entities; still in development.  SEERN is one of 
four regions involved in the HSIN pilot program, with the main “hub” of 
the SEERN region being located in Atlanta.29 
 
NOTE:  DHS intends for HSIN-JRIES to become the single primary 
information sharing and communications system to connect their HSOC with 
federal, state, and local public safety entities, as well as with the security 
management for critical infrastructure – key assets/resources – and other 
private sector communities.  Reportedly, the HSIN system will enable the 
HSOC to easily and quickly disseminate information and alerts to network 
members, and network members should be able to easily submit information 
to the HSOC, where it will be assimilated and analyzed with all other 
intelligence from a variety of perspectives – global, national, regional, state, 
and local.   
g. GISAC Supervisor:  GBI Inspector, Special Agent in Charge, 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge, or Designee 
GISAC Supervisors are the primary points-of-contact for incoming official 
intelligence/alert information designated as classified (Secret, Top Secret), “Law 
Enforcement Sensitive” (LES), and “For Official Use Only” (FOUO).  Dissemination of 
 
29 Stephen Clark (Chief Analyst, Georgia Emergency Management Agency) interview with author, 
Atlanta, Ga., February 23, 2005. 
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classified, LES, and FOUO intelligence from GISAC must be reviewed and approved by 
a GISAC Supervisor.  When authorized to share such information with other state and 
local stakeholders, GISAC can employ a variety of communications systems, depending 
on the urgency, priority, and sensitivity/classification of the information.   
GISAC maintains its own internal telecommunications system, but relies 
on the Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s computer network, which includes internet 
access.  Additionally, GISAC can utilize both GEMA’s and the GBI’s Communications 
Centers, which provide enhanced communications capabilities on a 24/7 basis. 
h. Organizations 
GISAC has established close working relationships with numerous 
organizations that have serious interest in terrorism related information, threats, incidents, 
and counter-measures.  These organizations are able to serve as two-way communications 
conduits, through which GISAC can easily and quickly disseminate information to 
organization members, and through which members can forward information and 
concerns to GISAC.  Some of these key “stakeholder” organizations are listed below: 
• Georgia Homeland Security Task Force (GHSTF) 
• Georgia Sheriff’s Association (GSA) 
• Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police (GACP) 
• Georgia Association of Fire Chiefs (GAFC) 
• SouthernShield (consists of representatives of state homeland security and 
counter-terrorism intelligence operations from Georgia, Alabama, Florida, 
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Tennessee) 
• PrivateShield (consists of representatives of corporate security operations 
for corporate icons with major assets in the Atlanta area) 
i. Activity Report (former Lead Sheet) 
• Will include all reported suspicious activity to GISAC from law 
enforcement and concerned citizens. 
• Activity Numbers (Lead Numbers) will be assigned by a supervisor at the 
time of the supervisor’s review/assignment. 
• The information will remain an ACTIVITY REPORT if it does not qualify 
as an INTELLIGENCE REPORT. 
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• Any follow up documentation, to include records checks, developed as 
part of the ACTIVITY REPORT follow up; will be maintained in the 
ACTIVITY REPORT file. 
• A SUPPLEMENTAL ACTIVITY REPORT will also be available for 
additional documentation.  The supplemental will also be database driven. 
j. Intelligence Report T 
• Will be developed at the direction of a supervisor. 
• Will be written from information obtained in the ACTIVITY REPORT 
and any follow up investigation. 
• The information being reported should be criminal or suspected criminal 
activity. 
• The INTELLIGENCE REPORT will be entered/maintained in accordance 
with GBI Policy. 
k. Intelligence Case  
• Will be opened at the direction of a supervisor. 
• Must have a criminal violation. 
• An INTELLIGENCE REPORT may develop into an INTELLIGENCE 
CASE at the supervisor’s discretion. 
• The case file will be maintained in accordance with GBI Policy.  
l. Analytical Support 
Analytical support involves assembling terrorism intelligence information 
in a logical manner in an effort to determine patterns and meaning.  GISAC Analysts and 
Agents can provide a variety of analytical and charting services in support of terrorism 
investigations.  These services include the following: 
• Fusing Information:  Review and merge intelligence information with 
existing data in the intelligence system so that it may be analyzed. 
• Link Charting:  Establish relationships among entities, individuals or 
organizations in an investigation. 
• Event Charting:  Show the chronological relationships between persons, 
organizations, and related events. 
• Flow Charting:  Depict the flow of money, narcotics, weapons, stolen 
goods or other commodities through the elements of a criminal and/or 
terrorist network. 
• Activity Charting:  Define the pattern or sequence of a terrorist 
operation, including modus operandi. 
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• Telephone Toll Analysis:  Condense large volumes of data into easy to 
read automated reports from which the significant telephone activity may 
be identified. 
• Case Analysis:  Summarize intelligence information, investigative actions 
taken and the main findings associated with these actions, and the 
activities of the subjects. 
• Special Publications:  Develop publications on various terrorism 
intelligence topics.  The topics are determined by interest, availability of 
data and need for the information.30 
m. Dissemination 
Terrorism intelligence information will be disseminated to members of 
GISAC participating agencies when the requester has a need to know and a right to know 
the information in the performance of their duties. 
Dissemination of information requested or submitted to GISAC will occur 
only with the express authorization of a GISAC supervisor, or when there is a specific 
dissemination protocol established by GISAC policies or procedures that dictates when 
and how certain information is shared/disseminated. 
Information requested or submitted through GISAC will be disseminated 
to the GBI work units in the jurisdiction of the request/submission unless such 
dissemination is limited by GISAC or applicable federal restrictions. 
GISAC Intelligence Reports (maintained in GBI Criminal Intelligence 
System) will only be disseminated by GISAC or the GBI Intelligence Unit with the 
express authorization of a GISAC supervisor.  This will ensure that classified and 
sensitive information is not improperly released, and that GISAC is aware of any 
submissions or requests by other agencies that may be relevant to terrorism issues.  
GISAC and the GBI Intelligence Unit will maintain a record indicating 
who has been given information, the reason for release of the information, and the date of 
each dissemination outside of GISAC or the GBI Intelligence Unit. 
 
30 Stephen Clark (Chief Analyst, Georgia Emergency Management Agency), interview with author, 
Atlanta, Ga., February 23, 2005. 
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Nothing in this directive shall limit the dissemination of an assessment of 
terrorism intelligence information to a government official or to any other individual 
when necessary to avoid imminent danger to life or property. 
In fact, when information relating to a potential terrorist threat is received, 
GISAC proactively identifies public safety and other government agencies, as well as 
private-sector entities that may have a legitimate need to know about the threat.  
Subsequently, information is shared in a manner that will enable governmental and 
private-sector entities to protect life and property.  
n. Conclusion 
One important mile stone that helped to determine the GISAC’s value was 
the Group of Eight (G8) Summit held at Sea Island, Georgia on June 8-10, 2004.  This 
was the first major event to test the GISAC and its ability to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate relevant intelligence, with a variety of local and federal agencies in a national 
forum.  The GISAC was also responsible for coordinating event activities and dignitary 
travel with these agencies and still maintain a sense for public safety issues such as 
rioting and street crimes.  Because the GISAC was already operational, coordination of 
these activities were accomplished with few problems.  The GISAC was the central 
intelligence and command center for the state during this event and proved itself very 
capable in coordinating both the law enforcement and intelligence activities for this 
event.31   
The GISAC is one of many similar preventive initiatives that evolved by 
state agencies in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  
Information/intelligence fusion centers like the GISAC are important in identifying and 
addressing the gaps in our state and local intelligence networks.  States where such 
centers do not exist run the risk of missing important clues that could identify, detect, and 
prevent a terrorist attack in their communities.  The measures and practices implemented 
by the GISAC project represent significant improvements to Georgia’s capabilities to 
 
31 Charles D. English, “The Georgia Information and Sharing Analysis Center: Model for State and 
Local Governments Role in the Intelligence Community”, Thesis Paper, Naval Post Graduate School, 
Monterey, Ca, June 2004, 44-46. 
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detect terrorist threats posed by domestic, as well as international terrorists.  The strength 
of the GISAC lies in its people and its resolve to meet the needs of the people of Georgia.  
The GISAC is a well run and well organized intelligence center that is evolving to meet 
the changing security needs of the terrorist threats of tomorrow. 
The diagram below, provided by GISAC, represents the flow of information 













































                                                
C THE TERRORISM EARLY WARNING CENTER (TEW) 
Los Angeles County boasts as being the largest metropolitan area in the Untied 
States with a population of over ten million people, living in 88 cities and spread over 
4,000 square miles of urban terrain. Calculating an appropriate methodology for terrorism 
prevention and response coordinated with law enforcement, fire, public health, military, 
and emergency services is no small task.  Like many large metropolitan areas, Los 
Angeles County realized that the casual partnerships formulated in the past were no 
longer enough to provide the detailed cooperation and planning needed for an effective 
security partnership that this vast area needed.  
The Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) was the first operating fusion center 
in the country and was created to form a countywide group that was capable of a highly 
coordinated response to acts of terrorism, based on careful assessments of information, 
intelligence and detailed planning.  The TEW met for the first time in October 1996 
through the hard work and vision of two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputies, 
Sergeant John Sullivan and Deputy Larry Richards. Sullivan and Richards watched the 
many acts of terrorism in the world (mostly under the direction and funding of Osama bin 
Laden) and realized that the terrorist groups were operating from a complex network 
located in various parts of the world.  Sullivan and Richards believed that the only way to 
effectively fight a terrorist network is to have a counterterrorism network working against 
it that shares information among different federal, state, local and private sector agencies. 
From this basic premise, the TEW was created. 
The first TEW meeting was held with only a hand-full of representatives from the 
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, the FBI, Los Angeles Police Department, 
representatives from the California Office of Emergency Services, and several from 
academic and research institutions.  Sullivan and Richards shared a vision and strategy 
with this small group that instilled cooperation and team work.  Many in that first 
meeting understood the importance of working together with other agencies if they 
wanted to be successful in combating terrorism.32      
 
30. John P. Sullivan (Sergeant, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), interview with author, Los 
Angeles, Ca., February 16, 2005. 
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The Los Angeles County TEW initially set out to create a management 
framework and establish interagency partnerships among the various participating 
agencies.  While “cooperation” among law enforcement agencies was a relatively 
common idea, the every day practice was far from a reality.  Sullivan and Richards knew 
that the only way to make the TEW work (correctly) was to develop relationships that 
allowed interagency information sharing, fuse the different intelligence disciplines, share 
information, jointly investigate emerging threats, train and exercise against terrorist 
scenarios, and provide tactical support to responding agencies.  This model did not exist 
and was not commonly embraced by initial shareholders.  The previous standard operated 
in the traditional stovepipe model, where information flows up and down the agency 
hierarchy but rarely outside the walls of the agency.  The TEW had the formidable task of 
implementing this new idea into a county having 45 different police departments, 38 fire 
departments, and 80 hospitals.  Many said it could not be done!33   
The TEW got its first test in the summer of 1998 when the first national anthrax 
alerts were being generated.  The TEW was the first such fusion center to predict that the 
anthrax attacks were coming to Los Angeles County.  This prediction was predicated 
upon intelligence and open source information sharing which the TEW collected, 
analyzed, and then disseminated as an Emergency Preparedness Bulletin on terrorism 
awareness to agencies within Los Angeles County.  These Emergency Preparedness 
Bulletins served as policy advisories on how to respond to weapons of mass destruction 
and anthrax for law enforcement agencies through-out California.  A short time after the 
bulletins were disseminated the anthrax attacks began!  Although the attacks were all 
identified as hoaxes, agencies throughout California began looking to the TEW for 
information, situational updates, and bulletins which were used to set policy and 
operational response plans for law enforcement and fire departments.34  
 
 
33 John P. Sullivan (Sergeant, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), interview with author, Los 
Angeles, Ca., February 16, 2005. 
34 Lois Pilant, “Strategic Modeling,” Police Law Enforcement Magazine, Los Angeles, Ca, May 2004, 
2-3. 
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Over the years, the TEW has consistently provided the same type of support and 
direction for such events as the “Westwinds Exercise,” Y2K, and the Democratic 
National Convention.  The TEW’s input into the success of these events really gave the 
TEW the recognition it needed to both expand its operational influence and to attract 
funding support from local, county, and federal sources.  The TEW’s value was being 
recognized for the first time by many agencies within the Los Angeles County area as a 
place to look for helpful answers, information, and support. 
The events of 9/11 forever changed the way U.S. law enforcement and fire 
departments looked at emergency response for first responders.  Los Angeles County was 
no exception; immediately after the first plane crashed into the World Trade Center, the 
TEW expanded operations with additional staff from local, state, and federal agencies 
operating as a part of the LA County Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB).  Since 9/11, 
the TEW has maintained a permanent position (with limited staff) at the LA Sheriff’s 
Department EOB.  With this evolution, the TEW now has permanent funding through 
Los Angeles County and the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).35   
TEW’s success at facilitating cooperation, teamwork, and information sharing 
among agencies in Southern California is no small feat.  Commander Michael Grossman 
stated “the cooperation and team spirit needed to make the TEW work took years to 
cultivate, many of the TEW’s shareholders were agencies that did not have a history of 
working cooperatively with other agencies in the past.”  The TEW has succeeded because 
of the personalities of the initial people assigned to work and develop the TEW.  
Grossman stated that once there is a trust between agencies (which starts at the working 
level) real sharing can take place.  Grossman noted that “it just takes time to build that 
trust-it’s a process not an event.”36  By creating partnerships in the public and private 
sectors with relevant disciplines, the TEW was able to develop the network needed to 
address the intelligence gaps that previously existed between federal, state, and local 
levels.  
 
35 Michael Grossman (Commander, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), interview with 
author, Los Angeles, Ca, February 17, 2005. 
36 Ibid. 
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1. The Mission and Role of the TEW 
The TEW is designed to be an all source, all phase multi-agency, 
interdisciplinary, intelligence fusion center for the Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Area.  The TEW works during all phases of operations (pre-, trans-, and post-attack or 
threat) to assess the impact of terrorism and related threats in order to provide situational 
awareness and understanding to decision-makers at agencies of all levels, to include fire, 
health, and law. 
The TEW also, monitors trends and potentials which may result in terrorist threats 
or attack within the Los Angeles County Area.  The center evaluates all sources of 
information, including open source data, researching threat information to guide 
operations, training, and planning efforts.  These “early warning” efforts provide support 
for law enforcement, fire, and emergency response personnel in making better informed 
decisions when a crisis is happening.  The TEW also works to identify precursor events 
when assessing trends and potentials, with a focus on prevention and mitigation.37  
2. Responsibilities 
The TEW monitors trends and assess threats that could result in terrorist attacks in 
Los Angeles County.  Currently, members of the TEW evaluate media accounts, 
information from federal, state, and local agencies, and other open-source data to 
determine the credibility of the information or source.  As part of this assessment, the 
TEW identifies terrorism precursor events so that prevention and mitigation efforts can 
be undertaken. 
The TEW also establishes protocols to identify and distinguish those threats 
credible enough to warrant a response and determine the level of response that is 
required.  This has the extra benefit of providing cost savings because more complete 
information is available for initiating an appropriate level of response, rather than always 
sending a full-force response.38 
 
37  James P Royal (Sergeant, Los Angeles Police Department), interview with author, Los Angeles, 
Ca., February 16, 2005. 
38 John P. Sullivan (Sergeant, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department), interview with author, Los 
Angeles, Ca., February16, 2005. 
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The TEW also assess threats and hoaxes, suspicious devices, and suspicious 
outbreaks of disease.  Part of this responsibility includes monitoring special events that 
have the potential for terrorist attack. 
During an incident, the role of the TEW is to provide information to incident 
commanders.  In addition to providing “playbooks and target folder” (response 
information folders) the TEW continues to gather intelligence and assess new 
information for actionable cause.  TEW’s familiarity with their vast reservoir of 
information makes them a well prepared group for identifying potential sources of 
attacks, recommending courses of action, and providing continuing intelligence support 
and technical assistance to on-scene incident commanders.  The TEW has been integrated 
into the Los Angeles area Unified Command structure for the last seven years. 
3. Goals 
The LA TEW is the focal point for analyzing the strategic and operational 
information needed to respond and combat terrorism and protect critical infrastructure 
within its area of responsibility.  Special emphasis is placed on early detection of 
emerging threats, including acts employing weapons of mass destruction (MWD) such as 
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents and information warfare 
(IW or cyber-terrorism).   
The LA TEW supports the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center 
(CEOC), the interagency terrorism working group (TWG), and the jurisdictional EOC’s 
of all 88 cities in the operational area of the TEW.  The TEW assesses all source 
information, including police reports, leads, and open source intelligence (OSINT), to 
forecast trends, potentials and support operations.39 
4. Objectives 
The LA TEW’s objectives include:  
Providing indications and warnings (IW), including on-going disease surveillance 
to the public safety community and critical infrastructure partners to enhance prevention 
and readiness. 
 
39 Roz Rosentrater (Crime Analyst, Terrorism Early warning Center), interview with author, Los 
Angeles, Ca, February 16, 2005. 
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Performing Operational Net Assessments (PONA) to gauge in the impact of a 
specific threat or attack and development viable courses of action for the CEOC, city 
EOC’s,  department operations centers (DOC’s), and incident command posts (ICP’s), to 
enhance the response to an attack. 
5. Strategies 
The LA TEW embraces a network approach to threat assessment, decision 
support and course of action development.  The TEW utilizes data-mining tools, as well 
as standardized “Intelligence Preparation for Operations (IPO)” products to build all-
source situational awareness and a common operating picture for the interagency 
response community.  Typical IPO products include playbooks, response information 
(Target) Folders, Mission Folders, and Templates.  A key element of the TEW process is 
the net assessment process to assess incident consequences. 
6. Action Plans 
During a known threat period or the aftermath of an attack, the LA TEW will 
actively monitor and assess situational awareness and status of all events that may impact 
the operational area.  In addition, the LA TEW employs advanced technological means 
(known as forensic intelligence support units) to facilitate situation assessment and 
course of action development for the public safety community. 
The LA TEW (either actual staff or virtual capacity) will focus on monitoring key 
public gatherings, the status of emergency services, and the status of all infrastructural 
components.  The impact of actual attacks within and without the TEW’s area of 
responsibility will be assessed in order to gauge resource needs and shortfalls and to 
develop potential courses of action to support incident resolution.   
In preparation for an actual operation, the LA TEW provides support the 
operational areas CEOC, and the incident unified management structure. 
• Assesses and develop new technology, tools, and analytical frameworks to 
improve support. 





                                                
7. Outcome Verses Output 
The LA TEW provides a platform of network, multilateral, and horizontal 
communication of the threat information, and intelligence needed to manage a complex 
urban emergency operation.  The LA TEW’s net assessment process provides all 
source/all-phase fusion to perform “Operations/Intelligence Fusion” with an emphasis on 
both current and future operations.  The LA TEW bridges the gap between crisis action 
planning and deliberate planning to provide the information necessary to achieve 
interoperability for complex, interagency, interdisciplinary, coalition-type operations. 
TEW Watch Supervisor Sergeant James Royal and Crime Analyst Roz 
Rosentrater provided the following information regarding how the TEW works and 
products useful for shareholders: 
a. Indications and Warning (Pre-Attack/Trans-Attack) 
The TEW provides the following operational and strategic information for 
senior decision makers and on-scene commanders:40 
• Intake point for all terrorism related leads, reports, including crime reports 
and leads. 
• Assesses pre-incident indicators from a multidisciplinary perspective. 
• Conduct threat assessment and estimates. 
• Develop response and threat assessment tools (playbooks and target 
folders). 
• Scan and monitor open source indicators of terrorist activity to assess trans 
and potentials. 
• Synthesize threat information from all sources to develop situational 
awareness. 
• Coordinate TLO (public sector law, fire, health) and ILO (private sector 
Infrastructure of Liaison Officers) programs. 
• Develop collection plans; task leads to investigative agencies (e.g. JTTFs, 
and other criminal investigative/intelligence entities), and provide 
analytical support to same. 
• Maintain liaison with other fusion centers throughout California and the 
nation. 
 
40 Roz Rosentrater (Crime Analyst, TEW), interview with author, Los Angeles, Ca, February 16, 
2005.. 
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• Provide consequence management consultancies (e.g. threat assessments), 
technical support and reach back.). 
• Conduct training and special workshops on terrorism and emerging 
threats. 
• Issue Advisories, Alerts, and Warnings, as well as special reports. 
8. Operational Net Assessment (Trans-Attack/Post-Attack) 
During an actual event, the TEW performs operational net assessments to 
determine the scope of the event and its impact on the Operational Area.  The net 
assessment mission supports the Operational Area Emergency Operation Center (CEOC), 
and other command nodes within incidence unified command structure.  A typical net 
assessment mission would follow this model: 
• As directed, the TEW will provide a Unified Command Structure (UCS) 
with the impact of an actual attack on the Operational Area, gauge 
resource needs and shortfalls, continuously monitor and assess situational 
awareness/status, and act as the POC and law enforcement circles for 
interagency liaison in order to develop options for courses for actions for 
incident resolution. 
• Conduct situation assessment (determined ground truth). 
• Provide Advisories, alerts, warnings, net assessment and develop mission 
folders. 
• Conduct Resource/Situation Assessment and assess alternative courses of 
actions for incident resolution. 
• Bridge investigative and response information needs, supporting county 
EOC, County EOC, City EOCs, Department Operations Centers, JIOC, 
and Unified Command Post, provide information/intelligence support for 
mutual aid and military support to civil authorities. 
One question that needs to be asked is, “Are there any measurements that can be 
referred to that indicate the TEW is accomplishing its goals?  There are currently no 
known measuring standards which indicate that a fusion center such as the TEW is 
meeting its goals or making a difference in the fight against terrorism.  That said, 
however, there are some tangible characteristics that need to be referred to as a sign of 
success.  Since the creation of the TEW, however, some very positive changes have 
occurred within the law enforcement community in Southern California.  New 
management frameworks between law enforcement agencies have been created and 
polished, this has taken years to develop and overcome traditional barriers and road 
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blocks that prevent intra-agency cooperation.  In 1999, a major WMD Field Training 
Exercise was held in Los Angeles (Westwinds).  One of the scenarios would involve an 
anthrax attack due to the potential of such an attack.  The TEW was a major sponsor of 
that exercise because of the intelligence they developed and produced several emergency 
Preparedness Bulletins on terrorism awareness to include WMD and anthrax.   
Approximately one week later, the (now somewhat famous) anthrax attacks started in 
various parts of the United States.41  The TEW was clearly able to show that the center 
was using the intelligence collected to take a proactive approach to terrorism. 
The TEW has grown from a hand full of people (mainly from the law 
enforcement community) to  nearly 400 officers, analysts and specialists from police, 
fire, military, federal law enforcement and intelligence officers, fire, public health, and 
private sector representatives.  It is an organization that has become a national model for 
fusion centers across this country- they must be doing something right!   
The issue of developing a viable standard to measure the efficacy of such centers 
is yet to be developed but could be the basis for a future thesis project. 
9. Functional Description 
The TEW has two major functions:  Indications and Warnings (I&W) and 
operational net assessment.  To fulfill these complex missions, the organization is divided 
into six interactive, multi-agency, and interdisciplinary elements.  These elements are 
designated to operate as a complete network and are described as follows: 
Officer-in-Charge (Command Element), who provides command, direction, and 
supervision, interacts with unified command structures responsible for sanitizing and 
disseminating classified information as necessary and ensuring multi agency coordination 
with local, state, and federal agencies. 
Analysis/Synthesis Element (A/S)  This is the central intergrading hub of TEW 
Net Assessment Group.  This element tasks out requests for information to all other 
functional elements, then collects and integrates their individual products into a cohesive 
 
41 Lois Pilant, “Strategic Modeling,” Police Law Enforcement Magazine, Los Angeles, Ca., May 
2004, 2-3. 
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assessment.  This includes capturing investigative information, intelligence from all 
sources criminal, classified, open source/OSINT, cyber INT cyber Net, imagery, 
reconnaissance, data bases, etc. and analyzing and synthesizing it.  A/S Element also 
synchronizes the information from the Law-Intel Element, Consequence Management, 
epidemiological I (EPI-INTL), and Forensic I Support (FIS)/Field Assessment Support 
Team (FAST) Element into a useable product for decision-makers.  Products issued by 
the A/S Element include advisories, alerts, warnings, issue-specific white papers, and 
mission folders.  Mission folders integrate treats specific playbooks, venue specific target 
folders, intelligence information, resource information, archival information on technical 
dimensions of threats of threat agents, resource status, and potential course of action for 
incident mitigation and response.   
Investigative Liaison Element (INV-LNO)  The Analysis/Synthesis Element. This 
element is responsible for processing, tracking, and collecting all criminal and national 
security intelligence information and leads related to terrorism.  This element is the 
primary point of contact with all classified, national and state data bases, and with 
investigative and intelligence efforts at all levels of the government.  This is the 
Operational Area/County link with the California Antiterrorism Information Center 
(CATC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).  This element is the link to the 
national network of joint terrorism task forces especially the Los Angeles Task Force on 
terrorism.  The INVLO Element has the capacity to deploy field observers and 
surveillance teams to assist specific threats.  This element is also responsible for tasking 
other specialized investigative entities to develop a complete intelligence picture.  
Information and intelligence developed by the Law Intel Element is integrated with other 
information/intelligence products developed by its partner Net Assessment Elements 
through. 
Consequence Management Element (CM)  This element is staffed by members of 
the fire service, law enforcement, and medical professionals (EMS/Operational 
Medicine) in order to assess current and future resource status, provide technical 
reference, and develop potential courses of action for response to terrorism involving 
chemical, biological, radiology, nuclear and large scale explosives (CBRE).  This 
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element has the primary responsibility for developing playbooks, targets folders, 
monitoring the status of resources, personal and critical logistical requirements for 
initiating and sustaining a comprehensive response. 
Epidemiological Intelligence Element (Epi-Intel)  This element integrates disease 
surveillance for all threats (especially biological terrorism) to complete 
analysis/assessment.  This element assures integration of public health, law enforcement 
investigations, provides planning estimates on distribution of casualties, potential 
quarantine and treatment issues.  This element ensures accurate and complete flow of 
information during intentional suspicious outbreaks, conducts continual monitoring to 
ensure early recognition and warning.  This element is also responsible for food and 
water surety and agriculture issues (including liaison to the public health community, 
water districts (IEDWP, MWD), and U.S.D.A. etc.” 
Forensic Intelligence Support (FIS) Element and Field Assessment Support Team 
(FAST)  This element is responsible for field assessment and reconnaissance activities.  
This element supports multi agency’s responses with specialized detection and sampling 
equipment and coordinates law enforcement support to fire service mass casualty, mass 
decontamination (MCMD) operations.  This element is also responsible for “virtual reach 
back” to specialist (at the national laboratories, military, etc.) to help us assess the 
situation and potential practical courses of action.  This element is responsible for 
modeling and simulation of potential incident consequences using technical means.  The 
FAST is the field expedient component of the FIS Element and links field information 
back to the TEW’s Assessment Group.42   
10. Intake and Informational Flow 
The TEW is currently in the process of merging with the Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center (JRIC) in Norwalk, California and the following description of the 
informational flow used at the TEW is a combination of what is currently in place and 
what will be the new procedure later in 2005.  
 
42 James Royal (Sergeant, Los Angeles Police Department), interview with author, Los Angeles, Ca, 
March, 2005. 
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TIPS/Leads:  Initial tips and leads come from a variety of sources to include 
private citizen call-ins, information from other law enforcement agencies and intelligence 
organization, the EMS community, military, and private business.  All initial tips/leads 
will be handled by appropriate intake personnel (depending on the source of the tip) and 
will be entered into the JRIC tips/leads database for review by a collection manager. 
Tips/Leads Recorded in Database:  Tips/Leads will be input by intake 
personnel into a common JRIC tips/leads database (MEMEX) via a standard intake 
screen.  Intake personnel immediately bring all urgent tips/leads to the immediate 
attention of a collection manager. 
Analysis Collection Manager Review:  An analysis supervisor/collection 
manager will review each tip/lead that is entered into the TEW/JRIC database.  The 
collection manager will evaluate each tip/lead as to source reliability and content validity, 
and task an intelligence analyst to conduct any necessary follow-up. 
Initial Notification to TEW/JRIC Management:  The analysis supervisor will 
make initial notifications to the TEW/JRIC manager regarding tips/leads which require 
immediate action, or may require a decision as to dissemination of a bulletin, advisory, 
alert, or warning. 
Dissemination:  All TEW/JRIC dissemination products are reviewed by 
managers prior to release.  The dissemination is made to the “approved” recipient list (all 
share holders). 
Leads Assigned to Analysts:  The analysis collection manager assigns each lead 
to one or more analysts for intelligence and lead value. 
Analysis:  Analysis refers to the ability separate information into “component 
parts” so that it can be understood from a structural (or network) point of view.  This 
includes identifying and analyzing the relationships between the parts (or bits) of 
information.  The TEW/JRIC Analysis section is comprised of subject matter experts 
from a variety of fields, who monitor terrorism trends and assess threat information 
which could result in terrorist attacks in the Los Angeles Operational Area. 
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The analysis process involves identifying information from tips, leads, and cases 
regarding known or new terrorist groups, activities, and actors, identifying known or new 
tactics, techniques, procedures, identifying potential target vulnerability and location 
information.  Each analyst will share and receive appropriate intelligence information 
with other units and agencies, and will consult with other subject matter experts from 
other agencies.  This process will be used to analyze individual and case information and 
analyze trends and potential indicators of future terrorist activities. 
These analysts assess information from a variety of sources, including open 
source and classified material, and try to evaluate all tip/lead case, trend and threat 
information for evidence of patterns and indicators that may be present.  This process is 
sometimes called “connecting the dots” which attempt to fit isolated and unrelated 
information into a more meaningful pattern. 
TEW Cells:  The TEW is divided into operational cells with subject matter 
specialists who provide analysis during the vetting and evaluating process.  The 
following is a description of each of the four cells: 
• Consequence Management − assess law enforcement, fire service, and 
health consequences of events by assessing real-time situation and 
resource status. 
• Investigative Liaison- coordinates with investigation and intelligence 
teams from local, state, and federal agencies. 
• Epidemiological Intelligence − is responsible for real-time disease 
surveillance, food and water surety, agricultural threat issues and 
coordination with disease investigations. 
• Forensic Intelligence Support − provides technical support, CBRN 
reconnaissance, geo-spatial (mapping, imagery, and modeling products) 
and coordinates feedback among the field, TEW, and subject matter 
experts. 
Investigative Liaison: Investigative Liaison Officers (INV-LNO) are non-
operational and will coordinate all lead and case information between the TEW and 
investigative/intelligence teams form local, state, and federal agencies. 
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Leads Assigned to FBI, LASD, and LAPD:  Investigative Liaison Officers will 
be responsible for ensuring that all leads requiring investigative follow-up are properly 
routed to the appropriate FBI, LASD, and LAPD squads. 
Leads Assigned to Outside Agencies- Analytical Support:  Investigative 
Liaison Officers will be responsible for ensuring that all leads are followed-up and are 
routed to the appropriate agency.  Analytical support to outside agencies maybe provided 
by TEW analysts.  
The primary agencies that have full-time members (officers and analysis) are as 
follows:  Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, 
The FBI, Los Angeles County and City Fire Departments, Los Angeles Airport Police, 
Los Angeles Office of Public Safety, and the Los Angeles Department of Health.  The 
primary focus of the TEW is to assess, detect, monitor, and if possible, disrupt terrorist 
attacks focused in the Los Angeles County area.  In formation developed which is not 
related to this geographical area is forwarded to an appropriate agency (usually the JTTF) 
by an investigative liaison officer. 
There is also a position at the TEW called “The Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO).  
The TLO is an integral part of the connectivity between the TEW and the 1st Responder 
community (police, fire, health, private sector) and are the points of contact for these 
agencies. 
Two other positions are about to be initiated within the TEW; the first, is an 
Infrastructure Liaison Officer who is the point of contact with railroad, highway and 
airport officials and provide planning and security briefings for these groups.  The second 
position is the Private Sector Terrorism Response Officer who provides awareness and 
facilitates reporting of suspicious circumstances by the general public (i.e. bus stops, 
shopping malls, and special events) to the TEW/JRIC as a regional clearinghouse. 
The TEW currently is not operational 24 hours a day; however, emergencies and 
urgent matters occurring after 6:00pm are routed through the 911 dispatch system.  The 




The TEW has proven to be a powerful tool in both integrating and coordinating 
local and regional resources in fighting terrorism.  The strength of the TEW comes from 
the full partnership of staff from agencies and jurisdictions drawn from a broader range of 
public safety disciplines.  Having more than just a law enforcement focus, the TEW can 
utilize its diversity to better represent the cooperation and collaboration of a vast 
information and intelligence network that capitalizes on sharing information to exploit 
our adversaries.  By including fire, public health, military, and private sector entities into 
this important homeland security partnership, which has traditionally been seen solely as 
a law enforcement problem, it allows law enforcement to view the terrorism problem 
from additional points of view.  These added perspectives allow for a more 
comprehensive response to our nation’s security needs.   
The operational flow chart that follows depicts how information and intelligence 
will be directed and handled at the TEW as it is received.  The chart depicted is a 
proposal for how information and intelligence is handled and evaluated when the TEW 
merges with the Joint Regional Information Center (JRIC) sometime in 2006.   
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter was originally titled “Best Practices-Best Methods,” however, for 
purposes of this paper the word “best” seems to have an insufficient meaning.  The word 
best has relative meaning based on unique circumstances, events, and operational 
environments.  Therefore, what is a “best method” for intelligence collection and sharing 
in Los Angeles might not be the best method in Atlanta.  Atlanta and Los Angeles are 
both large metropolitan cities but they have dissimilar local crime and terrorism 
problems; each city requires a different approach to their specific crime issues.  For this 
reason, the author chose to title this chapter “recommendations” based on the 
recommendations of the analysts, supervisors and managers at each of the three fusion 
centers as well as the personal observations and opinions by the author 
A Fusion Center requires the involvement and participation of all levels of 
government and private sector enterprises in order to identify the intelligence gaps.  The 
FBI defines an intelligence gap as any question that identifies a lack of information about 
a criminal or terrorist threat.43  That is, identifying the intelligence and information gaps 
tells us what we don’t know about the things we do know.  Intelligence requirements seek 
to fill the gaps of missing information useful to decision makers and policy advisors.   
The attacks of September 11, 2001, in our country, and those most recently on 
July 7 and 21 (2005) in Great Britain, demonstrate that those who want to commit acts of 
terrorism in our homeland may already be living in our local communities and are now 
engaging in suspicious or criminal activities in our neighborhoods as they prepare for 
future attacks against us.  The “fusing” process discussed in this paper illustrates the need 
for good collection and information management into actionable intelligence from all 
sectors at one location to support the immediate identification of emerging terrorism-
related threats (at a local level) so that information and intelligence gaps are minimized. 
 
43 Michael G. Potts, “Field Intelligence Group Operating Guidance for the Implementation of the FBI 
Intelligence Cycle,” FBI Policy Memo, April 2004, 2. 
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Successful counterterrorism efforts require the coordinated efforts of federal, 
state, tribal, local, and private sector agencies that have well-established information 
sharing capabilities to collect, analyze, and exploit information to be used against our 
adversaries.  State/Regional Fusion Centers appear to be the best mechanism in achieving 
this end because they provide an opportunity to break down intelligence stovepipes and 
overcome many of the traditional turf wars that have prevented the cooperative efforts 
needed.   
The kind of coordination this paper suggests is more than having a group of 
people from various agencies sitting together in a room.  The level of coordination 
needed requires collaborative relationships that allows for appropriate interaction with 
each other while fostering trust between them.  People must be able to leave their 
respective agencies and become a member of a new organization, each member being a 
resource from a home agency to be utilized for the common good of the center.  In this 
way, the many parts are brought together to make a whole.44 
The experiences of our many task forces nationwide have proven that, 
collectively, we can address criminal and terrorism problems faster, more efficiently, 
using less individual resources, and at reduced costs by working cooperatively rather than 
individually.  Individuals assigned to these centers must be able work in an atmosphere of 
trust and mutual cooperation to make a fusion center successful.  As with any endeavor, 
the process of inter-agency cooperation is usually slow but support from senior 
management from all participating agencies will go a long way in bringing these efforts 
to fruition more quickly. 
The three centers previously described have different structures and missions and 
each center has adopted different strategies to overcome problems unique to their 
geographical locations.  The following recommendations are provided as guidance for 
states and regions contemplating the creation of such a fusion center.  The 
recommendations provided have been compiled during on-scene interviews and 
observations of managers and supervisors from each center.  These recommendations 
 
44 Merriam-Webster, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary ,11th Edition (Merriam-Webster, Inc., 
Springfield, Massachusetts), 650.  
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come from individuals with extensive training and experience in fusion center 
development and should be considered as useful “lessons learned” for state officials 
attempting to create fusion centers of their own.  Some recommendations provided by the 
Homeland Security Council in April 2005 are also included.45 
A. DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions are provided to convey some universal understanding of 
the terms and concepts presented in this paper and provide a common basis in addressing 
the issues of an information/intelligence fusion center: 
Information–Raw data or facts that have not been processed or analyzed with 
regard to any other information. 
Intelligence–Information that has been processed and analyzed to determine its 
meaning and relevance to other information.  It is the product of a systematic collection, 
analytical, and evaluation process from raw data into an actionable meaning. 
Operational Intelligence–Intelligence that is required for planning and 
conducting major operations to accomplish objectives within an operational area. 
Intelligence Fusion–The process of organizing, analyzing, and synthesizing 
(blending) information from multiple sources to create vetted, validated intelligence 
products. 
Information Sharing–The process by which raw data is collected and 
disseminated among agencies, governments, and individuals.  
Intelligence Fusion Center (“Fusion Center”) –A physical location where 
analysts receive, process, and analyze all-source information and synthesize their analysis 
into intelligence products suitable for dissemination to relevant agencies and officials.  
They are also referred to as information/intelligence fusion centers and simply as “fusion 
centers.” For purposes of this paper, the term “fusion center” will be used. 
 
45 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Advisory, Intelligence and 
Information Sharing Initiative,” (White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 28, 2005), 3-5. 
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Risk Assessment–The process of identifying key assets and evaluating the threats 
to and vulnerabilities of these assets.  Risk assessments generally include three distinct 
components: criticality, vulnerability, and threat. 
Criticality Assessment–A systematic effort to identify, evaluate, and prioritize a 
jurisdiction’s assets.  Criticality assessments attempt to gauge the relative importance of 
these assets and determine the impact of an attack against them. 
Vulnerability Assessment–A systematic effort to identify and evaluate the 
weaknesses and susceptibilities to attack of a jurisdiction’s assets.  In identifying and 
evaluating existing weaknesses, a vulnerability assessment can determine ways to 
eliminate or mitigate the risks stemming from those weaknesses. 
Threat Assessment–A systematic effort to identify and evaluate existing or 
potential terrorist threats to a jurisdiction and its assets.  Threat assessments may yield 
only general information about potential risks due to the difficulty in accurately assessing 
terrorist capabilities, intentions, and tactics.46 
B. LEGISLATION 
Appropriate legislative agreements, laws, and memorandums of agreements need 
to be drafted and in place – that define collection, analysis, dissemination, procedures, 
and working partnerships–without infringing on the rights of private citizens. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, a number of legislative bills and laws were 
signed in an effort to improve information sharing at all levels of government; among 
them are: 
• The USA Patriot Act, signed in October 2001, among other things, 
mandates and gives law enforcement officials at all levels greater powers 
and authority for information sharing and gathering. 
• The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, signed in 2004, 
created a new national intelligence chief with direct mandates of creating 
environments for improved intelligence sharing across all levels of 
government. 
 
46 Lessons Learned Information Sharing website, “Best Practices, Local Anti-Terrorism Information 
and Intelligence Sharing: Intelligence Support for Response Operations,” July 10, 2005, www.LLIS.gov, 
accessed August 13, 2005. 
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• The Homeland Security Advisory Council in an April 2005 report on 
information and intelligence sharing gave strong recommendation that all 
states should establish multidiscipline fusion centers.    
C. PHYSICAL FACILITY 
Realtors have an old saying, “location, location, location!” as a way of reminding 
buyers that property values differs from one area to another.  Where the fusion center is 
located will have an impact as to what agencies will participate there.  A center that is 
located in the heart of a large metropolitan city would pose significant commuting 
problems for staff members living in adjacent communities.  Also, a major traffic 
accident or natural disaster could render the downtown area of a large city inaccessible. 
 The facility must be represented by various state and local agencies that have 
established this facility for processing terrorism-related information and producing 
analyzed intelligence for public safety officials.  By seating officers and analysts from 
various agencies together at one location, they naturally develop personal relationships 
that help to break down interagency resistance that prohibits information exchange.  This 
center will become the home of an information sharing network comprised of a group of 
agencies sharing information and intelligence with one common purpose.   
This facility should be operational 24 hours a day and have an appropriate staff 
and work space to accommodate representatives from all shareholders.  Centers should 
have (at the minimum) work spaces to include phones (secure/non-secure), faxes, 
computer work stations, shredders, copy machines, conference and meeting rooms, white 
boards, cable TVs, satellite antennas, Secure Video Television Conferencing (SVTC), 
monitors, projectors, one or more situation/incident command room(s), and appropriate 
IT tools and infrastructure to support the connectivity needs of the state or region at this 
facility with funding for system up-grades. 
The facility should be a separate center (not part of an existing EOC, etc.), a 
center that has been adopted for no other purpose.  Efforts to maintain appropriate 




                                                
easier.  This facility must be large enough to accommodate all operational, analytical, and 
task force related needs and must accommodate future growth demands (which will be 
inevitable). 
The facility must have suitable secured parking and storage capabilities, as well as 
access control for all visitor and employees entering the center. 
The facility should have back-up generating machines, pumps, and fuel in the 
event of electrical disruptions or long-term power outages.   
The center must have a designated secret compartmental information facility 
(SCIF) area for SCI information, which is separated from the rest of the center.  
Appropriately cleared individuals will handle all classified information collection, 
storage, analysis, and “scrubbing,” and ensure proper dissemination.47 
The facility should be able to accommodate sleeping quarters for an appropriate 
number of staff on a rotating basis for an extended period of time to address long-term 
crises.  
D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) 
The TEW in Los Angeles is utilizing an information data base at the center 
developed by the FBI called the TITAN system as a way of sharing certain information 
and products to a variety of shareholders.48  Currently, there are nearly 500 law 
enforcement members with 200 additional members being screened for inclusion, and 
almost 100 corporate members from various security related industries.  It works like 
this, TITAN takes the initial application from a potential member, vets the application 
against the member base and, once approved, then pushes certain information to the 
member based on their “need to know.”  Members of the TEW and JTTF decide the 
member’s level of “need to know.”  Law enforcement and intelligence agencies would 
have a greater need to know than an associate in the private sector.  Levels of “access” to 
 
47 Interviews at all three fusion centers indicate that less than 2% of information received is at a 
classified level and therefore the SCIF areas at these centers remain very small in relation to the rest of the 
center.  
48 James Royal (Sergeant, Los Angeles Police Department), interview with author, Los Angeles, Ca, 
March 1, 2005. 
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more law enforcement sensitive information would be restricted from members not 
having the need to know particular aspects of on-going law enforcement activities.  
TITAN primarily handles “sensitive but unclassified” information but could easily be 
expanded to accept and disseminate “classified” information as needed.49  This particular 
data base system (or something compatible with inter-face capabilities) could be utilized 
nationwide to allow each state the ability to communicate with each other on a day-to-day 
basis.  The particular system is not as important as the ability to communicate and access 
information from neighboring states or regions instantly without any communication 
barriers.   
The goal of each state fusion center should be to have connectivity to collect and 
disseminate appropriate levels of information with every police, sheriff, fire, EMS, 
county public health, transportation, and private sector agency  within the state. This level 
of communication should be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 
E. FUNDING  
Funding for a fusion center can come from federal, state, and private sector 
resources.  Funding for the TEW in Los Angeles, for example, is received partly from the 
County and City of Los Angeles, the FBI, and the State of California.  The centers in 
Arizona and Georgia primarily utilize funding received by state funds and funds 
committed by the FBI.  Federal funds can become available at certain times depending on 
world and national events which can also be used to offset local costs.  Available grants 
and application kits can be found using the DHS/ODP website at: www.ojp.usdoj.gov.   
One drawback to using only federal funds for intelligence centers is that those funds 
rarely continue for more than a couple of years, so when the federal funding ends, 
significant operational cutbacks have to be made by local agencies who don’t have the 
funds to continue such activities.  Often, when this scenario happens, the end result is a 
cut in personnel.  
Funding for fusion centers need to be looked at from two perspectives: short- and 
long-term. Short-term funding covers start-up costs (such as building 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
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construction/renovations, security systems, fencing, lighting, office equipment and 
supplies, etc.).  Long-term funding is obtained for ongoing operational costs such as 
personnel, training, updating equipment, overtime, computer systems and networks.  
Typically, federal funds should be considered as short-term funds that can be cut during 
any given funding year.  The generation of long term funding should be looked at from 
the local and/or state levels. 
In FY 2004, 2005, and 2006, The Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) has set 
aside several grant programs for fusion center technical assistance that can be used for 
creating state fusion centers (with guidance modeling for a LA TEW style center).50  The 
grant is called the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and gives money to states for 
various local homeland security purposes that include personnel, equipment, training, 
exercises, and fusion centers.  Federal funding for anti-terrorism information and 
intelligence sharing can be the difference in having a fusion center or not.  Federal 
funding is helpful because it eases the fiscal burden of local budgets and, at the same 
time, fosters greater cooperation and support from all agencies participating at the center. 
Staffing and funding are the two biggest issues to deal with when creating a 
fusion center.  DHS has provided funding to state and local agencies for protective 
clothing, computers, WMD exercise gear, etc., but little for personnel.  Many agencies 
are reluctant to hire additional personnel, using other grant funding, for fear future 
funding will be dropped and the additional personnel costs would then have to be 
absorbed by the local agencies (who are typically unable to continue providing those 
added costs).  If ongoing funding could be budgeted for staffing, part of that budget 
should be earmarked for a career track within the fusion centers that allows the center to 
create incentives and advancement plans for personnel who want to stay there and 
advance.  Fusion centers draw people from local law enforcement, fire, and health 
agencies that have not created adequate career advancement opportunities for their 
employees at the center. As a result, after two years, well-trained and experienced 
 
50 Kevin Saupp (Technical Assistance Program Manager, Office of Domestic Preparedness), interview 
with author, Washington, D.C., July 22, 2005. 
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personnel have to decide whether to leave and advance within their agency or stay at the 
center in a career-ending position.51 
DHS also offers money from the 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP), which provides a single application kit and program guidance for multiple 
funding programs to enhance our nation’s homeland security efforts.52   
One observation from the author; as I have traveled around the country over the 
last five years working with state and local agencies in anti-terrorism activities, state and 
local agencies have always looked to (and expected) the federal government to provide 
all (or a major portion) of the funding, training, and equipment for anti-terrorism projects 
and programs.  State budgets have not factored expenses for such newly specialized 
activities (such as fusion centers).  Recent history, however, has taught us that state and 
local governments must change the way they have looked at addressing (and fund) their 
local security needs.  A reasonable person would have to ask, “how much longer and how 
much more money can the U.S. Government continue to pour into state coffers when we 
are engaged in a costly war overseas, the national debt skyrocketing, social security on 
the brink of bankruptcy, and now we have just sustained one of the worst natural disasters 
(Katrina) in the last 100 years?” 
The recent hurricane (Katrina) in the South has illustrated that the federal 
government is not an entity of endless money and resources that can be instantly relied 
upon in every situation and condition.  Each state and city must work toward achieving a 
greater level of self reliance and less dependence on the federal government in order to be 
fully prepared.  At the least, state and local governments should have emergency 
operation plans and resources to independently deal with local disasters (man-made or 
natural) for the first three to five days of the incident without any federal support.  State 
and local authorities must make the hard choices that the fight for homeland security calls 
for.  This may come in the form or raising taxes, selling local or state bonds, portions of 
 
51 James Royal (Sergeant, Los Angeles Police Department), interview with author, Los Angeles, Ca, 
July 21, 2005. 
52 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Domestic Preparedness, “Fiscal Year 2004 Terrorism 
Early Warning (TEW) Expansion Program: Grant Application Kit and Program Guidelines,” March 2004. 
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state lottery proceeds going towards local homeland defense, or cutting other social 
entitlements often taken for granted and largely spent on non U.S. citizens.          
F. STAFFING 
As mentioned previously, having the right personnel is vital for having a 
successful center.  Beyond having employees who are motivated, competent, and 
hardworking, they must have the proper education and training in intelligence synthesis 
and analysis.  This kind of background is not easily found at the local or state level.  The 
author has observed some departments and local agencies simply transferring secretaries 
and clerks to positions of “analyst” within an intelligence bureau to meet an immediate 
need, often with little or no training in intelligence.  While many of these people are 
excellent employees, their skills and knowledge base is lacking when it comes to 
addressing the analytical needs of an intelligence center.  The lack of uniform training 
and standards creates a big problem not only for the individual state center but it also 
hampers effective intelligence coordination and dissemination between other state and 
federal centers. 
One suggestion to address this problem would be to develop an “Intelligence 
Analyst Academy” (IAA) at the state level.  Since the fusion center will be gathering 
information and intelligence from virtually all law enforcement, fire, public health, and 
private sector groups within the state, representatives from each group should be 
canvassed and recruited to develop a suitable candidate pool to draw from for students at 
the IAA.  Former government and military employees or retirees with intelligence 
backgrounds and clearances could be recruited for these positions as well. 
The students could be taught in a variety of subjects such as: intelligence 
gathering methods and techniques, the difference between information and intelligence, 
what is analysis and how it is done, report writing standards, handling/processing in-
coming information, phone tips, how to handle un/classified information, training on 
various data bases used by the center and state, and daily production products 
(dissemination).  There are a variety of subjects and courses that could be developed in 
the IAA curriculum and a certification process which could be the subject of another 
thesis. 
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At the end of the IAA, students would receive a state certificate indicating they 
were “certified” as an intelligence analyst.  To keep the certification current, analysts 
would have to complete 20 -40 hrs of “in-service” training each year.  For career 
development and promotional purposes, advanced courses or certificates could be offered 
at the Academy.  The IAA should receive the same attention and emphasis by state 
leaders as the police and fire academies do to make it effective. 
G. GENERAL GUIDELINES–ORGANIZATION/STRUCTURE (THE 
PROCESS) 
Jurisdictions employ a number of mechanisms to share terrorism-related 
information.  Dissemination is the foundation for sharing.  Historically, information has 
flowed “downward” from federal and state agencies to local entities that then 
disseminated the information to appropriate public safety and private sector groups.  A 
common complaint with that procedure is that much of the information is not timely or 
relevant for local jurisdictions that eventually get the information.  In recent years, local 
law enforcement has collected information at the local level and began transmitting it 
“upward” to state and federal entities for appropriate use and dissemination.  When 
information begins to flow in both directions, national and local entities can benefit from 
the developing information networks that are forged and used to facilitate the flow of 
information across all levels of government. 
With that said, local agencies must have in place specific policies as to what kinds 
of information they will share and to whom.  Dissemination policies allow for standards 
to be set that allow for appropriate persons to have access both within and without the 
agency.  Without standardized intelligence products, agencies and departments will waste 
valuable resources and not share information effectively.53  
One of the principal outcomes of a fusion center is the identification of terrorism-
related leads; that is, any nexus between crime-related information and terrorist activities 
on a broader scale.  Although the primary emphasis of information/intelligence fusion is  
 
 
53 David L. Carter, “The Law Enforcement Intelligence Function: State, Local, and Tribal Agencies,” 
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Washington, D.C., June, 2005, .6-7.  
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to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats, a collateral benefit to 
state and local entities is that it will support ongoing efforts that address non-terrorism-
related issues as well.   
Managers and directors of each fusion center provided specific guidelines and 
suggestions as essential requirements for establishing such a center, as follows:  
The sustaining foundation of any agency is determined by the quality of its 
personnel.  Staff personnel must have up-to-date training, awareness, and understanding 
of the global and domestic threat environments current in the world today.  This is 
achieved by ongoing training and information/intelligence analysis.  Detailees should 
plan on a two-year minimum commitment to the center. Center personnel must develop a 
clear understanding of the links between terrorism-related intelligence and non-terrorism-
related information, so that precursor activities can be quickly identified as indicators of 
an emerging threat.  Analysts can then separate the “wheat from the chaff” and direct 
resources toward issues posing the most immediate threat.  
More specific to organization and staffing, specialized analytical cells are needed 
in the center with more expertise regarding certain groups, regions, and possible tactics.  
The analytical groups could also be divided into strategic analysis, gap analysis, and 
targeting projection thus creating more subject matter expertise within the center.  By 
allowing certain staff members to receive advanced training and specialized 
proficiencies, they can become subject matter experts that improve and add credibility for 
the center. 
Connectivity to and with all shareholders utilizing the center must be provided, 
including an appropriate IT infrastructure with security backstops to ensure appropriate 
levels of information, based on the needs and responsibilities of the shareholder.  It would 
not be appropriate for private sector business staff (for example) to have access to data 
bases containing ongoing law enforcement investigational information.   
Connectivity with critical intelligence networks, analysis centers, communication 
centers, and information repositories is mandatory.  Ideally, each state would have at least 
one fusion center. Each state should be able to have connectivity with the other fifty state 
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fusion centers as well as connectivity to a national fusion center (yet to be created).  The 
logical location for this National Fusion Center would be next to (co-located with) the 
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) outside Washington, D.C.  Local FBI JTTFs 
and Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) help bridge some of the gaps between local and 
federal agencies but they are not enough.  A national fusion center, created in a similar 
fashion to the local fusion centers and co-located with the NCTC, would fill the gaps 
currently in our system that prevent intelligence proficiency. 
Electronic networking provides the best and safest way of sharing information 
across jurisdictions.  Agencies must have secure intranet and email systems that can 
disseminate mass volumes of information instantly and with ease.  These systems can be 
password protected allowing for different levels of access based on people (and agency) 
needs and rights to know.  
There must be a clear delineation of roles, responsibilities, and requirements at 
each level of government participating in the fusion center.  Senior officials must also be 
informed about this asset as another source for information in policy and planning issues.  
Fusion centers can play a vital role in drafting emergency announcement broadcasts 
during ongoing disasters.  This objective can easily be done by tabletop and full field 
exercises. 
The center must have clear intelligence and information requirements with the 
federal intelligence community, guiding planning, collection, analysis, dissemination, and 
reevaluation efforts. 
Publicity for the center is crucial.  The center must be well advertised, with 
appropriate telephone numbers published, to promote continuous interaction between the 
center and all shareholders (particularly the private sector and general public).     
While most information handled in a fusion center is non-classified (law 
enforcement sensitive), there are times when a center would generate or receive classified 
information (usually via a JTTF) in monitoring an emerging threat.  Center staff must be 
trained in guidelines and policies.  Appropriate storage areas and cleared personnel must 
be in place to accommodate such information. 
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In an executive order on information sharing, from President Bush, he directed 
federal and local agencies to “protect the freedom, information privacy, and other legal 
rights of Americans in the conduct of intelligence-sharing activities.”54  Strict guidelines 
and procedures must be in place to ensure that this executive order is not violated. 
Active participation by specially trained and/or educated people (subject matter 
experts) are needed to provide immediate insight and help on evaluations for threat/attack 
assessment and recovery estimates. 
The center must have continuous interaction with the private sector and the 
general public.  This can be done through advertisements, Agency Liaison Officers, 
private sector liaison contacts, and tip and information lines to the center. 
As described, the fusion process involves every level of government and tries to 
embrace all sections of public and private disciplines to ensure that no intelligence gaps 
are unidentified.  At a minimum, fusion centers should be organized at a statewide level 
with each state establishing and maintaining a center with the previously described 
caveats to facilitate the fusion process.  In larger metropolitan areas, localized fusion 
centers should be considered to establish similar capacities that provide links with larger 
state, regional, or federal fusion centers.  The Los Angeles TEW is perhaps the best 
example of how a large metropolitan area makes this all work.  The Los Angeles TEW 
has been consistently successful in monitoring incoming intelligence, identifying trends, 
and coordinating responses with law enforcement, fire, health, military and emergency 
service agencies for the past ten years! 
National standards now being developed and finalized by DHS should provide 
additional guidance on this process, however, particular infrastructures and operational 
protocols used by individual jurisdictions should be based on the specific needs and 
capabilities of each jurisdiction. 
 
54 George W. Bush (President of the United States), Executive Order #13356, “Executive Order 
Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans,” White House Press Office, 
Washington, D.C., August 27, 2004, 2. 
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Under the direction of DHS, a Homeland Security Council was organized in 
October of 2004 for the purpose of exploring issues and possibilities in forming statewide 
fusion centers.55 The following suggestions were provided by this council as additional 
criteria for inclusion into the fusion process: 
H. MANAGEMENT AND STRUCTURE 
• The center must clearly define the management structure and determine 
who is in charge and what entity will be in charge of daily operational 
activities. Leadership can become confusing when personnel from 
multiple agencies come together in one place, each with different ranks 
and operating protocols.  
• The center must clearly define goals and objectives so all shareholders can 
understand and support the fusion process. 
• The center must clearly establish a process to define information and 
intelligence collection requirements. 
• The center should develop the appropriate agreements and memorandums 
of understanding that communicate requirements. 
I. PLANNING AND REQUIREMENTS 
• Conduct a comprehensive and compatible risk analysis to include threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence assessments. 
• The center should be able to identify patterns and trends that reflect 
emerging threats. 
• Must have well defined collection requirements based on risk assessments. 
• Readily identify circumstances and events that are indicators and/or 
precursors of threats or attack. 
• Be able to identify and tap into sources and repositories of data and 
information warehouses that help identify indicators and precursors. 
• Identify existing collection gaps through evaluation of current sources of 
information/data banks. 
• Create public awareness (both of the problem and the center) activities 
that enhance situational awareness by the public.  Develop partnerships 
with public and private officials that help with making this awareness a 
reality. 
 
55 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Advisory, Intelligence and 
Information Sharing Initiative,” April 28, 2005, 3-4. 
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• Develop and incorporate mechanisms to support reporting of collected 
information (e.g., 911 system, tip lines, internet, and connections to key 
information systems). 
• Identify and understand the different regulatory, statutory, and privacy 
issues that impede the collection and sharing of information. 
• Most of the above issues can be accomplished by having a robust training 
and exercise program in place that emphasizes each criterion.   
J. COLLECTION PROCESS 
• Communicate collection requirements to relevant state, federal, tribal, 
local, and private sector entities. 
• Mitigate roadblocks to collection activities. 
• Compile both classified and unclassified data banks of information and 
intelligence that is generated by people, organizations, and governments. 
• Serve as an initial point of contact (24/7) for information provided by 
various state and federal agencies (e.g., FBI, DOD, DHS, CIA, NSA, e-
mail bulletins, and telephone calls) for the receipt of the following: 
 
1. Immediate threat information (classified/unclassified) 
2. Long-term threat information (classified/unclassified) 
3. Tactics and methods used by terrorists (classified/unclassified) 
 
• Integrate with other reporting systems (e.g., 911), and establish an easy to 
use capability for the public for reporting suspicious activities in 
conjunction with the Joint Terrorism Task Force. 
• Establish a process for identifying and tracking the reports of suspicious 
activity and threats-follow-up. 
K. ANALYSIS 
• The center must be able to blend data, information, and intelligence 
received in high volume and from a multiple of sources. 
• Reconcile and de-conflict various data streams, and validate the credibility 
of this data received from these collection sources. 
• Evaluate and analyze data and information using subject matter experts to 
help decision makers. 
• Identify and prioritize risk factors and threats faced by the various 
jurisdictions (e.g., local, county, state, and region). 
• The center must be able to produce value-added intelligence products that 
are timely, accurate, and useful for the end-users.  These intelligence 
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products will support the development of performance-driven, risk-based 
prevention, response, and consequence management programs. 
• The center’s analysis will produce specific protective measures to identify 
and disrupt potential terrorist attacks during the planning and early 
operational stages. 
L. DISSEMINATION, TASKING, AND ARCHIVING 
• Identify those entities and people (e.g., officials, executives) responsible 
for developing and implementing prevention, response, and consequence 
management efforts and cultivate their support and funding. 
• Provide relevant and timely intelligence to those entities responsible for 
implementing prevention, response, and consequence management efforts 
(public and private sectors). 
• Develop appropriate archival mechanisms for data, information, and 
intelligence, for future review and to support future response efforts. 
• Establish a method for tracking performance-based prevention, response, 
and consequence management measures. 
• Establish the ability to track performance metrics associated with 
prevention, response, and consequence management efforts. 
• Provide feedback and after-action reports to information collectors and 
providers. 
M. REEVALUATION 
• Develop a tracking system of achievement prevention, response, and 
consequence management performance metrics so as to evaluate impact 
on the risk environment. 
• Constantly up-date threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments so 
as to update the risk environment. 
• Continue to monitor and assess the effectiveness of national (e.g., federal, 
state, tribal, and local) intelligence and information collection 
requirements process. 
• Continue to monitor the center’s operational, procedural, and policies to 







56  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security Advisory, Intelligence and 
Information Sharing Initiative,” April 28, 2005, 5-6. 
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N. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Looking ahead to the next ten years will require fusion centers to adjust 
proceedures, up-date technologies and information sharing systems, hire better trained 
and multi-lingual analysts and investigators, and develop long term funding strategies to 
maintain the quality of these centers for the future.  The next ten years will require fusion 
centers to raise the bar of operational expectations to include more intensive training and 
exercising, improved social network analysis, improved interagency and interdisciplinary 
collaboration at the state and federal levels, and improvements in recognizing emerging 
threats and groups. 
The events of the last five years have only re-confirmed the need for our 
intelligence and law enforcement community to change our methods of operations.  
Despite many evolving changes in the intelligence community, there remains a similar 
structure of stovepipes and old-time cultures consistent with the cold war era.  Whatever 
our failures were prior to 9/11, the U.S. intelligence community did what it was designed 
to do; it focused on U.S. interests overseas, with little attention to the activities linking 
overseas activities with domestic events.  The complete scope of necessary changes is 
still being evaluated with real world events continuing to be a driving factor.  General 
discussions about how to fix the problem have resulted in a number of proposals to create 
new organizations and new networks (like fusion centers). The suggestions presented in 
this thesis will give states a foundation to develop suitable fusion centers for themselves 
in an effort to distance themselves from the line of thinking that lead to the disconnected 
events leading to 9/11.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
As various committees within the United States Government have reviewed the 
circumstances leading to the events of September 11, 2001, evidence suggests that the 
collective information leading to that event fell into an intelligence void somewhere 
between foreign and domestic threats.  The U.S. foreign intelligence agencies were 
watching for foreign based threats to our homeland that were generated from overseas 
and the domestic agencies were looking for evidence of foreign sleeper cells preparing to 
act within the United States.  At the time, none of the agencies were looking for a foreign 
threat aimed at domestic targets nor was there a way to share each agency’s information 
that might show such a threat existed.  The attacks that came were not from deeply 
entrenched sleeper cells but from foreigners who had recently infiltrated into the United 
States to launch their attacks on that day. 
The final report generated from the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission Report) suggested that the September 11th 
attacks were successful (in part) for the following reasons: 
• Intelligence was not properly shared due to legal, procedural and 
inadvertent reasons. 
• The hand-offs of information were lost across agency divides, separating 
the foreign and domestic intelligence information systems. 
• Individual agencies were not working as a team, each had individual 
specialties but no governing body to provide oversight and ensure that the 
intelligence holes were filled.57 
The incidents of both 9/11 and those more recently of July 7, 2005 (in the U.K.) 
provide the reminders that information gathered by state and local agencies can be 
extraordinarily useful in fighting terrorism if properly collected, analyzed, and 
disseminated.  In preparation for a terrorist attack, terrorists may be engaged in other 
criminal activities such as trafficking, smuggling, narcotics activities, finance operations 
and money laundering in local areas.  Often, state and local agencies are better able to 
 
57 The 9/11 Commission, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 2004), 353. 
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identify, report on, and help prevent terrorist acts before the terrorists  have an 
opportunity to act than some of the better known federal agencies.  When fully functional 
and integrated, a state or local intelligence center working in close coordination with 
regional and/or federal agencies can collect, analyze, and disseminate actionable 
intelligence and provide a bridge to the intelligence gaps identified by the 9/11 
Commission.  This multi-level coordinated effort allows for a more blended anti-
terrorism approach while at the same time breaking down the stovepipes and agency 
barriers that have maintained the bureaucratic turf wars of the past. 
This thesis has been written to provide both a model and an argument for the 
merits of a fusion center and how it can provide state and local agencies an opportunity to 
break down the barriers currently impeding information sharing.  Much has been done at 
the federal level to help improve the atmosphere of intelligence flow across all levels of 
government but state and local agencies can also facilitate such activities by not only 
utilizing the various federal grants and loans now available but also local and state 
resources generating funding for the careful creation of localized integrated fusion 
centers.   
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APPENDIX  
A. THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER 
(GISAC) INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OUTLINE: 
1. CLASS 1 INFORMATION – High Threat, High Urgency, High 
Priority 
1-A − Terrorist Attack / Activity Related to WMD (Information, with 
specificity and credibility, indicating that a WMD terrorist attack, activity, 
or event has occurred, is occurring, or is imminent) 
1-B − Terrorist Attack / Activity Not Related to WMD (Information, 
with specificity and credibility, indicating that a non-WMD terrorist 
attack, activity, or event has occurred, is occurring, or is imminent) 
1-C −  Apparent / Alleged Criminal Activity Related to Terrorism 
(information relating to criminal activity, such as those involving guns, 
bombs, threats, thefts, etc., that appear to be associated with extremists 
groups or other terrorist organizations) 
1-D −  Apparent / Alleged Criminal Activity Not Related to Terrorism 
(information relating to criminal activity that does not appear to be 
associated with extremist groups or other terrorist organizations) 
2. CLASS 2 INFORMATON – Undetermined Threat, Some Urgency, 
Medium Priority  
2-A - Vague Terrorist Threats (Information, without specificity, 
indicating a possible terrorist attack/threat, or information that may 
constitute only suspicious circumstances that appear to be, or are 
consistent with, possible terrorist activity) 
2-B - Suspicious Circumstances (suspicious persons, activities, 
vehicles, infrastructure related, etc.)  
2-C -  BOLOs, Alerts, & Bulletins (look-outs and warnings 
communicated from government sources) 
3. CLASS 3 INFORMATION – Low Threat, Not Urgent, Low Priority 
(absent specific threat) 
3-A - Requests for Assistance/Queries (“Do you have any info 
about?”) 
3-B - Protest Event (anti-war, anti-government, animal rights, abortion, 
etc.) 
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3-C - Target Event (sporting events, concerts, celebrations, 
inaugurations, dignitary appearances, etc.) 
3-D - Other (information that does not appropriately fit into any of the 
categories listed above and is deemed to be low threat, low priority, and 
not urgent) 
B. THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER 
(GISAC) PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS: 
1.  Duties:  Answer telephone calls, and document submitted information and 
requests. 
2.  Instructions, aids and “go-bys”: 
a.  GISAC Activity Report forms:  See Attachment A 
b.  Instruction Sheet(s) and Examples:  See Attachment B 
c.  Important Telephone Numbers:  Black notebooks in “War Room” 
3.  Personnel Administration Issues: 
 a.  Supervision: 
b.  Shift Supervisors:  One GBI ASAC or SAP per shift. 
c.  Inspector:  GISAC Inspector is Robert Hardin 
 4.  Work Hours / Shifts:  Initially, the GOC will operate with two 12-hour shifts, 
shift times to be announced.  As the situation develops, the number of shifts, shift 
times, the number of personnel utilized per shift may be modified. 
5.  Duties / Expectations:  Agents assigned to the Information Intake Group 
should be at GISAC and in the War Room at least 15 minutes before their shift 
begins for shift briefing and new instructions. 
6.  Sign-In / Sign-Out:  There will be a sign-in and sign-out sheet in the War 
Room; all agents will sign the sheet beside their name, and will note the time of 
their arrival and departure at the end of their shift.  Agents will not sign in as on 
duty more than 30 minutes prior to their assigned shift time, unless expressly 
authorized by a supervisor. 
7.  Breaks:  Breaks can be taken as needed. 
8.  Clothing:  Business-casual attire is authorized.  Khaki pants and blue GBI 
“golf shirts” can be worn, but patches, badges, and weapons should not be 
displayed when outside of the GISAC office suite. 
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9.  Display of Identification and Weapons:  Agents are encouraged to display 
credentials while in GISAC office, but should not display any identifying badge, 
patch, or credentials when out of the GISAC office suite. 
 
10. Parking:  Agents should park their vehicles at the southwestern corner of the 
parking lot in front of the building. 
 
11.  Sickness or Injury:  Agents who become ill or injured should immediately 
contact their GISAC shift supervisor for instructions 
 
12.  Contacts with family & friends:  Calls to family members and friends from 
the GISAC office are permitted, but should be very limited in time and number.  
Calls made with personal cell phones or at personal cost while off duty are 
allowed without limitation. 
 
C. THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER 
(GISAC) EQUIPMENT/SUPPLIY NEEDS: 
1. Office Equipment 
a.  Locations: 
• Telephones 




b.  Operating Instructions 
• Telephones 




2. Supplies Needed: 
a.  Forms 
• Instructions 
• Examples/Samples 
 b.  Ink Pens 
3.   Agent Equipment: 
a.  Weapons 
• Duty Weapon 
• Exposure of weapons in the building and parking lot 
b.  Other Equipment 
• Portable Radios 
• Southern Linc Radios 
• Cell Phones 
• Laptops 
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4.  The various systems, both traditional and “high-tech,” used by GISAC to 
disseminate terrorism intelligence/alert information to other state and local entities are: 
a.  Conventional Communications Systems 
• Telephone (traditional) 
• Fax Machine 
• Cellular Telephone (voice, text, and photo) 
• Southern Linc Radio (two-way and group mobile) 
• Local Area Network (LAN) E-mail 
• Internet E-mail 
• Pagers (Georgia Technology Authority Paging System) 
• GBI Radio (two-way mobile and base) 
• National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS) 
b.  Mass Communications Systems  
• Blast Fax – GEMA’s automated fax transmitter that is pre-
programmed with fax numbers that are categorized into various 
groups, including the following: 
• Georgia Emergency Management Staff 
• Georgia Office of Homeland Security 
• Georgia Homeland Security Task Force 
• Police Chiefs 
• Sheriffs 
• 911 Centers 
• Department of Motor Vehicle Safety 
• Dept. of Natural Resources−Law Enforcement   
• Emergency Coordinators (for all state agencies) 
• EMS/Ambulance Services 
• Fire Departments 
• EMA Directors 
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• Dialogic System – automated telephone calling and messaging 
system that can rapidly call numerous pre-programmed telephone 
numbers and transmit a pre-recorded voice message.  Information is 
categorized similarly to the Blast Fax groups listed above. 
• Group E-mail – internet E-mail system with pre-programmed and 
categorized E-mail addresses enabling simultaneous transmission of 
messages and documents to computers and PDA’s.  E-mail addresses 
are categorized similarly to the Blast Fax groups listed above. 
• Group Paging – for state personnel and others who have assigned 
GTA Paging System pagers, individuals or groups can be rapidly 
paged with an alpha-numeric message.  
c.  Bulletins and Alerts  GISAC collects, compiles, and summarizes 
significant terrorism, public safety, and homeland-security related 
information in two separate bulletins.  GISAC also occasionally prepares 
and distributes alerts/notices regarding urgent and high-priority terrorism 
and homeland security issues.  Those electronic publications are described 
below: 
• GISAC Open Source Bulletin – a weekly publication consisting of 
credible items of information and articles pertaining to terrorism, 
public safety, and homeland security issues that are compiled through 
research of numerous unrestricted internet sources.  This bulletin 
contains no classified, LES, or FOUO information and is widely 
disseminated to state/local government officials and corporate security 
executives.  It is primarily disseminated via E-mail and fax through 
GEMA. 
• GISAC Intelligence Bulletin – a monthly publication consisting of 
synopses and copies of terrorism and homeland security 
information/intelligence generated by GISAC or derived from other 
official bulletins, notices, and alerts that may not be available to other 
state/local agencies.  This bulletin is designated as “Law Enforcement 
Sensitive” (LES) and is only disseminated to state/local/federal law 
enforcement agencies.  It is primarily disseminated via E-mail. 
• GISAC Homeland Security Notice – an occasional publication, 
usually featuring a single terrorism/homeland security issue that is of 
particular concern, warranting rapid dissemination to the state/local 




D. THE GEORGIA INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS CENTER 
(GISAC) FACILITIES, LODGING, AND SUBSISTENCE NEEDS: 
1.  Orientation to facilities: 
a. Office layout 
b.  Group locations 
c.  Exits 
d.  Key Cards 
2.  In-House Food & Beverage Supplies: 
 a.  Bottled Water 
 b.  MRE’s 
 c.  Snacks 
3.  Emergency Equipment and Evacuation: 
 a.  Emergency Exits 
4.  Equipment 
    a. Fire  Extinguishers 
    b.  Flashlights 
    c.  Emergency Exits / Stairwells 
    d.  Gathering Site 
5.  Bathrooms: 
6.  Break Room(s): 
7.  Security Procedures: 
a.  Access to Office 
b.  Visitors 
8.  Lodging: 
a.  Direct Billing 
b.  Two occupants per room (on shift/off shift) 
9.  Off-Site Meals: 
 a.  Locations 
b.  Direct Billing 
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